STAGE III

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF

the AIBA Boxing Competitions After the Rio Olympic Games 2016

10 December 2021
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Chapter 1: Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

The Rio Summer Olympic Games (“Rio”) was one of the lowest points in the history of the International Boxing Association (“AIBA”). The opportunity for AIBA to generate change needed to finally stymie the corruption that had flourished within the organisation up until that point was squandered. To the outside observer the organisation in the face of accusations of bout manipulation took decisive action – AIBA stood down the Referees and Judges (“R&J”) and ITO’s unless they were EC members. Ever since, however they have been left in limbo. The Executive Director Karim Bouzidi (“Bouzidi”) followed suit, first suspended, and eventually dismissed. These actions however were an artificial smokescreen meant to detract attention from what actually happened at Rio as reported in the McLaren Independent Investigation Team’s (“MIIT”) Stage 1 Report.

In the year subsequent, President CK Wu was forced to resign from office as a result of his failings. The combination of the actions taken at Rio should have heralded a fresh start for the organisation. Instead, these same problems continued manifesting themselves. In particular the bout manipulation and corruption that had arisen at Rio could have disappeared. It did not! How did the manipulation and corruption survive the drastic actions and surface again after Rio? This Stage 3 Report provides some answers to that question. The previous Report released on 30 September 2021 dealt with the corruption at Rio. This Report deals with the post Rio corruption and manipulation after 2016 through to the present 2021.

After Rio, the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) de facto acted as a monitor of AIBA operations. The stage appeared set, under the guidance of the IOC, for a new organisation to rise, like a phoenix from the ashes. Alas, this was not the case! Instead, AIBA staggered through a revolving door of Presidents and Executive Directors causing instability and a lack of cohesive leadership from the top. Behind the curtain, there was constant interference from those formerly
in charge of AIBA. Those bad actors combined with the instability created by the revolving door of top management provided the environment where the corruption and manipulation could continue with similar intensity to the conduct at Rio. As a result, this Stage 3 Report uncovers the weaknesses of the destabilised AIBA structure. There was a loss of organisational knowledge and institutional memory; inconsistent application of rules; no appetite to investigate the organisation or individual complaints; and ineffective disciplinary process without the force of sanctions. All of these problems contained within a failing organisational structure, ineffective in its operation.

In Stage 1, McLaren Global Sport Solutions (“MGSS”) and its investigative arm combined with Harod Associates to form the McLaren Independent Inquiry Team (“MIIT”). The MIIT reported on the atmosphere of fear and retaliation that reigned throughout the organisation during the years leading up to Rio. That environment did not change in the post Rio era. Without the cohesive and strong leadership to shepherd the organisation through a period of rebuilding, various factions swept in, either influencing AIBA from behind the curtain or manipulating results in the boxing ring. The manipulation of sporting results went on unabated at several AIBA and Confederation level tournaments up until the 2021 World Boxing Championships held in Belgrade, Serbia from 26 October - 6 November 2021 (“Belgrade”).

The investigative work of the MIIT provided the ice breaker to suggest that AIBA take advantage of the opportunity presented at Belgrade to take a proactive approach to curb corruption. Coupled with renewed leadership in the election of Umar Kremlev led to a break down in the patterns of corruption which was demonstrated at Belgrade. Through the on-site work and presence of the MIIT we were able to observe the transition to a changing culture and environment, although AIBA is not entirely rid of its past today. In a turn of fortune, the positive events at Belgrade may now become the watershed that AIBA can capitalise on to move forward and put behind itself the lost opportunity represented by Rio.
The desire to change was reflected in the willingness of ethical R&Js and ITOs to come forward and report their concerns both to investigators and to trusted AIBA personnel at Belgrade. This is a definite seed of change from Rio, where with a few exceptions, a wall of silence existed. Given that in the years leading up to and including Rio the fear, intimidation and sanctioned corruption came from AIBA leadership. There was no trust in the organisation nor leadership so complaints or reports of bad behaviour were rarely made. Often if an R&J did make a complaint, they were not taken seriously and, to add insult to injury, would have likely resulted in loss of nominations to tournaments since they did not support the systemic manipulation.

Additionally, it is clear from the MIIT’s analysis of the disciplinary cases from 2013 to present (see Chapter 5) there was little trust in the organisation to investigate any complaints or concerns raised. The MIIT heard several protestations that members, staff and competition officials had nowhere to complain or report to, so they didn’t. Very few reports were made and of those that went to the Disciplinary Commission (“DC”) that it had little appetite to pursue them, often relying on the excuse that there was insufficient evidence.

This appears to have changed following the appointments of senior AIBA personnel earlier this year upon whom ethical tournament officials believe they can rely. It is vital that this apparent new era of openness and trust between AIBA and its ethical R&Js/ITOs is maintained and fostered. However, in order to achieve this, some additional reforms are required in order to prove to those principled enough to report their concerns (in what can still be an intimidating environment), that they will be rewarded with positive action in weeding out the corrupt elements within the organisation. Once trust is established on all sides, a roadmap for a positive future for AIBA can be secured.

The following chapters in this Report describe some of the historical legacy which laid the conditions for the corruption to continue post Rio; the affected tournaments; and the inadequate investigation and disciplinary process that existed to react to complaints. To light up the path
forward, the Report closes with a series of recommendations based upon the MIIT’s investigations of Stages 1 & 3.

This chapter in describing the summary of the principal outcomes of the third stage of the investigation might be considered out of sequence because the MIIT has yet to investigate the second stage of the investigation as outlined by the Terms of Reference. Stage 2 will cover the entire period of AIBA operations including actions of its Presidents from 2006 to the present in order to learn the lessons of the past, including being on the brink of bankruptcy. The leap over Stage 2 to Stage 3 arises out of the fact there were press reports of bout manipulation the ASBC Asian Boxing Championship in Dubai in the spring of this year. These allegations triggered the amendment of the Terms of Reference to include this Stage 3 investigation.

As such, the original purpose of this Stage was to conduct a thorough investigation on whether:

(i) there was any corruption or manipulation of results by individuals involved in the Refereeing and Judging at the 2021 ASBC Asian Boxing Championship in Dubai;

(ii) there was any corruption or manipulation of results at other competitions at the level of AIBA and its Confederations by individuals involved in the Refereeing and Judging; and

(iii) to identify where possible the individuals involved and recommend the appropriate courses of action.

AIBA management following approval of the Board asked MGSS to examine AIBA level competitions between 2016 and the present. In addition, correspondence between the IOC and AIBA led to the expansion of the investigation at Stage 3 to cover all matters of corruption including bout manipulation post Rio to the present.

Furthermore, there were elements of the Stage 1 investigation that the MIIT was unable to include in its Report of 30 September 2021 due to the receipt of certain data and documents from third parties without adequate time to analyse them for inclusion within the first stage Report. Therefore, this third stage Report also includes those elements to complete the requirements for the Terms of Reference related to Stage 1.
The amended Terms of Reference call for this Report on Stage 3 to be delivered to the AIBA Executive Board (“EB”) on 10 December 2021. This document is the Report arising out of that investigation.

1.2 Finalised Stage 1 Analysis of Rio Bouts

The judging of boxing is a highly subjective exercise with no objective benchmarks or references other than knockouts. The MIIT did not at the time of reporting in September 2021 have all the data available to complete its analysis of the Rio bouts but did indicate that some bouts were manipulated or were highly suspicious of being manipulated. Having undergone rigorous analysis of bouts as described in Chapter 2, section 2.3 the MIIT has concluded that it is virtually impossible to establish to the degree of legal certainty required for discipline to conclude that a boxing match has been manipulated. However, there is no final determination as to whether match-manipulation has occurred. In the course of reaching that conclusion the MIIT has identified the fact that the subjectivity of the judging and the difficulty in gathering evidence stands in the way of making definitive conclusions of bout manipulation.

The conclusion about bouts in Stage 1 led the MIIT to forgo conducting the same analysis of suspicious bouts in Stage 3 because it would be a waste of time and money with no conclusive answers. Information about the Stage 3 competitions that the MIIT has reviewed in the period under investigation form 2016 to now is set out in the Chapter 4. Therefore, the way to eradicate the problem is to have a fully functioning sport administration body, enforcing rigorous rules against the R&Js and ITOs who are officiating at any Championships and applying zero tolerance for breaches of the Field of Play (“FOP”) rules. This is the protection from manipulation that must be the case for AIBA to be an organisation without manipulation and other corruption affecting the competition in the ring. The balance of the Report focuses on how at present this will not occur unless the MIIT recommendations and those of the Governances Review Group (“GRG”) led by Professor Hass are applied. As we stated in Stage 1, the people are the problem, even when the rules and regulations are of the highest quality. The sport will need to ensure that it cultivates individuals with integrity to run the organisation.
1.3 Key Findings of Stage 3

1. The AIBA organisation is enveloped by the tentacles of some of its former senior management and elected personnel (see Chapter 2). One of the prime characters in this drama is former Executive Director Karim Bouzidi. He led the scheme to manipulate some R&Js in their judging of bouts at Rio.

2. Bouzidi concealed and failed to advise AIBA of his business affairs with EC Member, VP of AIBA and President of the African Conference, Dr. Abdellah Bessalem (“Bessalem”) which included a company known as Green Hill France-Afrique; copies of the incorporating document can be found in Chapter 2. That company was majority owned by the Bouzidi/Bessalem tag team. This presents a conflict of interest that would have affected vital areas within the organisation. Further investigation of this company is required in Stage 2.

3. Bouzidi’s deception and concealment continued after his dismissal. He continued to be a key actor in the AIBA organisation from behind the curtain including orchestrating election campaigns for a presidential candidate in 2018. This is only one of his multiple roles in the interregnum revolving door of Presidents and EDs after Rio.

4. Considerable outside influence from other actors exists in the operations of AIBA. This includes interference from its sponsors, former EC members, lobbyists and parties with an interest but otherwise not affiliated. This phenomenon needs to be discontinued and contained to enable proper administration of the organisation.

5. A system of manipulation was enabled by the organisational problems in the interregnum period. The manipulation of bouts that existed and flourished from 2016 to 2021 was more ad-hoc and less centralised than what was found to be present at Rio.

6. The pressures on officials to manipulate the bouts continued to come from some National Federations and National Olympic Committees. Their effectiveness varied depending on the official’s perception of personal harm or other potential retaliation and favour.

7. The turmoil of the revolving door of Presidents and ED’s facilitated the manipulation because there was reduced focus on the day-to-day operation of the organisation providing a safe haven for manipulators.

8. Factions of members in the EC were more interested in positioning themselves with those operating unofficially behind the curtain to pursue their ambitions in the rise to power within organisation.
9. Lower-level cheating by some R&Js and ITOs exists to pass accreditation exams. This damages the integrity of such an official from the very first time they are engaged as an R&J or ITO. The selection accreditation process requires a complete review.

10. The disciplinary process failed all AIBA stakeholders – individuals did not trust to make complaints or reports, and when they did, the complaint often went nowhere or wasn’t taken seriously. In the few cases where the Disciplinary Commission took charge, they often did not pursue their work relying on the excuse that the evidentiary burden of proof could not be met or on the basis of no evidence.

11. The disciplinary process and the codes of conduct did not allow for the proper collection of evidence. This needs to be reviewed and rectified.

12. Some evidence is emerging that bout manipulation may be occurring to facilitate gambling syndicates which will need to be examined further in Stage 2.

13. There has been noticeable improvement in the operation and administration of AIBA due to the leadership of the current President and the officials he has appointed such as the new Secretary General Istvan Kovacs and others.

1.4 MIIT Pilot Project at the 2021 World Championships in Belgrade, Serbia

At MGSS’s suggestion, AIBA invited the MIIT to deploy a three step vetting procedure of the R&Js and ITOs invited to participate at Belgrade. This was a pilot project aimed to test the viability of technology in a sport context, the ease of implementation, and the effectiveness at preventing bout manipulation. The MIIT agreed to complete the pilot within the time frame of the third stage investigation and provide a report which is included as Chapter 5.

The first step included a background check using proprietary technology that crawls the internet to find who might have any issues in their antecedents or history that may impact on their suitability to officiate in Belgrade. Several parameters were used and the MIIT’s former law enforcement analysts reviewed results and issued reports for each individual. The result of the first step vetting alerted the MIIT to two officials with sufficiently high integrity risk that it recommended AIBA remove them from the pool of available officials, which they did.
The second step of the pilot project was conducted on-site at the R&J hotel. The MIIT deployed an artificial technology Voice Analytics Tool to help screen R&Js and ITOs as to their integrity risk. The technology uses pertinent questions crafted by AIBA, MIIT and artificial intelligence experts to measure integrity risk from an individual regarding certain events, in this case manipulation or corruption. Each prospective R&J and ITO completed an automated phone questionnaire, choosing from eight available languages, from which the tool analysed the cognitive functions of the brain through the voice responses. The analysis produced an integrity risk score from Low Risk to High Risk. These risk results enable experts, like the MIIT, to focus resources on those participants who fall into the high-risk category, or who have knowledge of others posing potential risk. The high risk results were then assessed against the first stage vetting and against the intelligence the MIIT had collected in that investigation. This resulted in the MIIT assessing two individuals as high risk to the integrity of the Championship; AIBA was apprised of this information removed the two officials from the tournament.

The third step involved an exit questionnaire concerning manipulation and cheating but specific to the official’s experience at Belgrade. The same above process was followed in determining if there were any integrity risks and a further two officials were identified as high risk and were removed from official duties in the last days of the competition and put on a watch list for future events.

The pilot project was a success as indicated by the comments received from R&Js that they felt safer and secure in Belgrade than any previous competition assignments as an R&J.

1.5 Endnote

The discussions of various investigations undertaken by organisations other than MGSS, the creation of the Terms of Reference and the MIIT’s methodology are all detailed in the Stage 1 Report and are not repeated here.
Chapter 2: Lifting the Curtain on AIBA Tentacles

2.1 The Saga of the Rise and Fall of Karim Bouzidi

To many in the AIBA family, Karim Bouzidi (“Bouzidi”) came to prominence in the International Boxing Association (“AIBA”) following his appointment to the position of Interim Executive Director (“ED”) in June 2015, after the dismissal of Ho Kim from the same position. However, the history of Bouzidi’s involvement with AIBA goes back much farther to 2002. The unexpected elements of his career took place behind the curtain both prior and subsequent to his employment with AIBA and after his dismissal from the position of Executive Director in 2016. Before his appointment Bouzidi kept his relationships and business affairs connected to AIBA concealed. After his dismissal following Rio, he continued to flourish in a number of consultancy roles and promotional activities, while the R&Js suspended at Rio have not officiated for AIBA since. The latter is reflective of an inadequate disciplinary and investigation process that no action was taken against Bouzidi. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Bouzidi declined to be interviewed by the Special Investigation Committee (“SIC”) which investigated the allegations of manipulation at Rio. He continued to maintain an influential behind the curtain role in AIBA long after his dismissal and until earlier in 2021 when he unfortunately contracted a severe case of Covid-19. The MIIT made several attempts to contact him but his illness prevented any interview to go forward. This is one of the reasons the MIIT describes some individuals in this Report as part of the long tentacles of the past and present. This chapter provides the historical context for Bouzidi’s rise within AIBA and the mechanisms that he created to allow manipulation and corruption to go on during his tenure both at Rio and the lead up qualifiers to the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Summer Games.

The Bouzidi saga begins with his behind the curtain entry into the world of AIBA in 2002, with the former President of the African Boxing Confederation and now honorary Vice-President of AIBA since 2014, Dr Abdellah Bessalem (“Dr Bessalem”). According to Dr Bessalem they met at the Junior World Championships in Cuba where presumably their respective Algerian nationality gave
them a form of kinship. Their relationship flourished and grew from their inaugural meeting. Dr. Bessalem took Bouzidi under this wing and their relationship became one of co-dependence and mutual gain. Dr Bessalem introduced Bouzidi to everyone at the African and International levels of the sport. Bouzidi also assisted him in identifying promising athletes for the African Boxing Confederation and was involved in missions for the AIBA Tunis Boxing Training Center, which was managed at the time by Dr Bessalem.

Dr Bessalem, was a loyal supporter of former AIBA President Anwar Chowdhry (“Chowdhry”) from Pakistan; so much so that he was “making the campaign” to re-elect Chowdhry in 2006 against the eventual winning candidate, CK Wu.

The Bessalem/Bouzidi tag team was an important segue into the patronage of the sport for the younger Bouzidi. Dr Bessalem had a long involvement with AIBA and was a highly influential figure. He was appointed as AIBA honorary VP during the 2014 Congress at Jeju Island South Korea in November 2014. Prior to this he had been a full time AIBA VP as well as the President of the African Confederation (2001-14), and before that, General Secretary of the African Confederation. Since the Sydney Summer Olympic Games in 2000 he was a member of the AIBA Medical Committee. He also qualified as an International Technical Official (“ITO”) and was often seen in the role of Supervisor/ Technical Delegate.

Importantly, around the same time that the Dr Bessalem/Bouzidi relationship was introduced, Dr Bessalem also met the owner of Green Hill, a Pakistani based sport equipment company which enjoyed a long-term licensing and supply contract with AIBA while Chowdhry was President. Green Hill was involved in the supply of sports equipment to various countries including the African states. It has been alleged that Chowdhry had some personal financial arrangements with Green Hill. The company allegedly helped with supplying gifts of equipment to promote the re-election of Chowdhry in his 2006 campaign for which AIBA later had to pay (this has not been investigated by the MIIT as it was not part of its remit in Stage 3)¹. Nonetheless, the close

¹ The full investigation will be undertaken and reported on in Stage 2.

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relationship which Dr Bessalem struck up with Green Hill informs the pathway and opportunity for Bouzidi’s entry onto the AIBA stage. The closeness of this relationship was denied by Dr Bessalem during his interview, but there is no doubt it existed, lasting at least until 2014 after his appointment as an Honorary VP of AIBA. It is through this web of relationships between various AIBA and external persons that Bouzidi was eventually brought into the key administrative roles within AIBA.

At some point between 2002 and 2005, the Bouzidi/Bessalem tag team met with Green Hill. On 31 May 2005, they incorporated and founded the French company, Green Hill France-Afrique. The incorporation papers are shown below.

In his interview with the MIIT, Dr Bessalem acknowledged this was his former address on the document. He also stated that the signature under his name was 90% his signature alongside Karim Bouzidi’s signature.
The MIIT was provided the corporate records and certificate of dissolution of this company, listing both Bouzidi and Bessalem as shareholders along with a third individual, Hakim Bouziane.
During his interview with the MIIT, Dr Bessalem initially denied knowing anything about this company. He said that his signature must have been obtained through signing piles of papers and he had not realised what he was signing. He began to acquiesce when it was pointed out that he was almost a 50% shareholder in the company, eventually explaining that the signature was 90% his. Despite that concession he continued to reaffirm that he had nothing to do with the Green Hill company. He subsequently confirmed that the company had been created for Bouzidi. He added that he may have been stupid to agree to the setting up of the company but had never
invested any money in it or received any in return. The questions of why the company was called Green Hill, nor the purpose for which the company was created, were never answered. Critically, Dr Bessalem did not, or would not, explain these matters.

From 2005-2013, according to one of the MIIT’s confidential witnesses, Bouzidi was responsible for the sales side of the company. Green Hill France-Afrique flooded the African market for eight years with Green Hill products. Dr Bessalem made the introductions and Bouzidi made the sales. When confronted with the fact that Dr Bessalem was Vice-President of AIBA and President of the African Confederation and used those positions to directly profit from the sale of Green Hill products, former and present AIBA members told the MIIT they were not aware of this. Nor were they aware that Bouzidi was involved as a shareholder and Managing Director. Dr Bessalem’s role in the company was categorically denied by him in his interview.

The timing of the foregoing events is crucial when it comes to the election of a President. In 2006 Chowdhry was out and CK Wu was in charge of the Presidential suite having come to power. The new management recognised that Green Hill had too strong a relationship with the former President Chowdhry and that it had at the time a monopoly of sports equipment supplies to AIBA. In addition, queries were raised with the Executive Committee (“EC”) about some of their activities. Due to the above, Ho Kim as CK Wu’s new Executive Director had at the time high suspicions that the past President and Secretary General had misused AIBA’s funds. For example, by offering boxing equipment to National Federations on behalf of AIBA just prior to the congressional elections. Therefore, Ho Kim asked PwC to investigate/audit the contract with the approval of CK Wu. On 5 December 2006, PwC sent their first findings.²

On 14-15 June 2007, the AIBA Executive Committee (“EC”) met in Lausanne, Switzerland. During this meeting, François Carrard, at the time AIBA Ethics Commission Chairman, explained to AIBA EC members that the AIBA President had asked him, among other matters, to review the PwC Report dated 14 February 2007 and to send him his recommendations concerning individuals

² AIBA766 - 2006_12_05 - Email from PwC to Ho Kim on First Findings AIBA766a - 2006_12_05 - PwC First Findings.
involved in irregularities. Ho Kim clarified that the business relations between AIBA and Green Hill in the past years showed irregularities in the accounts as per the PwC Report. Therefore, following the recommendations from the AIBA Ethics Commission, the AIBA EC unanimously decided that AIBA should at this stage stop doing business with Green Hill. In addition, the AIBA Ethics Commission recommended that AIBA “...immediately, irrevocably, and definitively part with all officers, other individuals, or entities responsible for or associated with, directly or indirectly, all irregularities ascertained by PwC and referred to in the PWC Report.” Such persons as mentioned above included the former President Chowdhry who the AIBA Ethics Commission recommended “…should be declared ineligible, for life, for any officer’s function or mission of any kind within AIBA”. The AIBA EC unanimously approved this recommendation. This was their decision despite an offer from Green Hill to allegedly pay one million USD for their rights as a main supplier to be reinstated. The MIIT will investigate the details of this alleged payment offer during Stage 2 of this investigation.

The events that went on here are remarkable. No comment is made on the dispute between AIBA and Green Hill at this time and perhaps is a matter for the final part of the MIIT investigation in Stage 2. However, there is no doubt that whatever the issue, there was a clear and unequivocal ban issued on Green Hill by the EC.

During this same period of time, AIBA Vice-President Dr Bessalem was a Director and almost 50% shareholder of a Green Hill named company. This represented a significant conflict of interest and vulnerability for AIBA, yet was not declared by Dr Bessalem or indeed his collaborator, Karim Bouzidi when he interviewed for a position with AIBA, discussed below. With two associates of Green Hill on the inside, relevant EC discussions and associated documents could have been funneled directly into Green Hill.

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3 AIBA767 - 2007_06_11 - Report of the AIBA Ethics Commission to the AIBA President.
5 AIBA778 - 2007_02_14 - PwC Audit Company Report - Extract.
6 The same situation has the potential of repeating itself in 2021. The current President of Green Hill has won a contentious presidential election for Pakistan’s National Boxing Federation which could see him become a member of AIBA.
Progressing the Bouzidi saga, the next ascent for Bouzidi towards AIBA high office came in 2010. AIBA had created the World Series of Boxing (“WSB”) and new franchises were being founded to compete. One such franchise was founded in Paris in 2010 by former boxer and Olympic gold medal winner Brahim Asloum (“Asloum”), known as Paris United. Through Dr Bessalem, Asloum met and hired Bouzidi to act as General Manager of the team. The three Algerians became so intertwined that during the WSB bouts in Paris the supervisor for the competitions was often Dr Bessalem. The franchise dream however was short lived and in 2012 Asloum declared bankruptcy. At the end of 2012, Dr Bessalem prepared the entry onto the AIBA stage for Bouzidi. According to the MIIT’s confidential witness Dr Bessalem was building a strong alliance within AIBA. Indeed, Dr Soltani informed Ho Kim of Bessalem’s plans as early as 2008 to assume greater influence in AIBA and eliminate certain Executive Committee members who opposed him.

Bouzidi joined AIBA in 2012 as Chief Operating Officer of the WSB, and became its Chief Executive Officer in 2013. The Executive Director, Ho Kim, hired Bouzidi to assist on all strategic decisions and to develop the nascent competition formats - AIBA Pro Boxing, World Series of Boxing and AIBA Open Boxing. Bouzidi’s CV\(^7\) indicated that his experience in boxing stemmed primarily from his role as General Manager for the Paris United team. What was not listed on his CV is the fact that he was a Director and almost 50% shareholder of Green Hill France-Afrique. Conveniently, he failed to disclose this role. If that had been disclosed, he would not have received a job offer because Ho Kim advised the MIIT that the situation would be a definite conflict of interest. Indeed, the MITT submits that Bouzidi’s relationship with Dr Bessalem exposed through this corporate structure would have been a further reason not to employ him.

The substantive influence of the Bouzidi saga commences at this time. What is witnessed is the arrival of Bouzidi, who has never been part of a National Sports Federation, who never worked with or within AIBA, and who has never held an official position neither in the professional, nor in the amateur spheres of boxing. Nevertheless, he rose through the ranks within AIBA. Bouzidi

\(^7\) AIBA769 - CV Karim Bouzidi.
had by this point been an associate of Dr Bessalem for eight years, and the person hiring Bouzidi knew nothing about their relationship. Karim concealed the connection between himself and Green Hill. This is a process the MIIT has observed repeatedly in our investigation of AIBA officials holding positions outside the core functions of AIBA or individuals moonlighting to earn more money.

While AIBA was trying to distance itself from Green Hill, the company was actively trying to influence members of AIBA to expel Ho Kim and reinstate their lucrative long-term contract with AIBA. In 2015 Ho Kim was dismissed from AIBA and Bouzidi was promoted into that role. By this time Bouzidi/Bessalem had dissolved the Green Hill Subsidiary France-Afrique, but it is clear that their ties to the parent company remained strong. Soon after his ascension to Executive Director (“ED”) Bouzidi reinstated the supply and licensing contracts with Green Hill. Whether there was any monetary payments or the execution of the Green Hill one million dollar payment to be reinstated will be investigated in Stage 2.

The MIIT has spoken to numerous witnesses about the events surrounding Ho Kim’s departure and Bouzidi’s ascension. There are multiple versions of events that the MIIT has heard surrounding Ho Kim’s dismissal, which it will not comment on as it is not part of the Terms of Reference. However, what is objectively clear is that there has existed outside forces acting in their own self-interest to the detriment of AIBA and honest members of AIBA for years. Often facilitated by corrupting a group of AIBA members, gaining their support and subsequently having them do their dirty work from inside the organisation.

It is as a result of these relationships formed between AIBA members and outside interests which allowed Bouzidi to usurp the functions of the various bodies within AIBA during his tenure as Executive Director as described in Stage 1 of the MIIT’s investigation. As the MIIT’s confidential witness stated, “It’s like a seller of newspapers becoming Executive Director with AIBA overnight.”

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8 The dissolution documents indicate that Bouzidi as the Managing Director of Green Hill France Africa, dissolved the company as he was sitting as the World Series of Boxing CEO in 2013.
Internally, Bouzidi had support from Dr Bessalem and had gained the trust of the secretariat. Many current and former employees said they preferred his style of administration to Ho Kim’s. Lastly, he charmed President CK Wu into approving certain requests which affected what went on at Rio. For example, Bouzidi signed the contract with Green Hill, not President Wu and Bouzidi was allowed to usurp control from the R&J Commission and micromanaged the appointments of R&Js including the 5 stars.

Eventually all of Bouzidi’s manipulation and positioning fell into place for Rio. The relationships he had cultivated internally and externally created what one of the MIIT’s witnesses called the “open bazaar” at Rio. By that it was meant that Bouzidi would approach Federations or National Olympic Committees through the R&Js that were loyal to him, seeking money in exchange for matches. One confidential witness described that it was the 5 stars that were mainly responsible, primarily the English and Algerian judges. When he had his core group of officials, including both 5 stars and 3 stars, all that he would have to do was to let his key point of contact within the 5 stars group know the required result to be relayed. The easiest way this could be achieved was through the system of fear and intimidation described in the MIIT’s Stage 1 Report. Therefore, the medals were being built by the corrupt manipulation of the bouts, which were being sold at Bouzidi’s ‘open bazaar’. Everything was on offer to be negotiated with payments to follow.

In a turn of fortune, the fiefdom he built within AIBA quickly dissolved and he was suspended from his position before the Rio games had even finished. As evidenced by the open bazaar as described in Stage 1, the MIIT found that there were indeed manipulated bouts. Reference to the Rio bout manipulation speculations described in Stage 1 but not fully investigated and finalised are to be completed in the Stage 3 investigation. In the following section of this chapter the stealth corruption scheme masterminded by Bouzidi is fully analysed and reported. It confirms the corruption regime of Rio, but does not provide the definitive analysis to say with the desired degree of legal certainty that definitively a particular bout was manipulated. As things spiraled out of control for President CK Wu on the world stage and in particular in the eyes of the IOC, he needed to be seen as taking decisive action. Couched as a “communications issue” and as a
means to protect the organisation, his decisive action was to suspend Bouzidi and the 5 stars R&Js at Rio with immediate effect, meaning before the end of the Summer Games.

Even during his period of suspension, Bouzidi was actively trying to collect on the negotiations and promises made during the open bazaar. A confidential witness\(^9\) reported that even after Rio and his suspension from office, Bouzidi still needed the money negotiated and promised for medal wins at Rio. He approached one Federation to ask for a sum of money in the six figures USD. Bouzidi explained to the Federation that despite what had happened at Rio (that they did not win a medal) he still needed the money to pay the judges. Given that he had been stood down, they refused to pay.

Bouzidi was officially removed from his post in October 2016. The damage had been done. The open bazaar, the external influencers, the internal relationships, the politics of the sport and the machinations of the Executive Director are equal elements of the crisis AIBA found itself in during and following Rio. While President CK Wu may have not been aware of the minutiae of the steps Bouzidi was taking, the role of leadership requires that accountability ultimately rests with the decisions made at the top of the pyramid of the organisation. President CK Wu hired Bouzidi, let him sign a contract with Green Hill, and gave him significant power with little or no oversight and no checks and balances. These are transgressions that only the President could have avoided and for that, he must be held responsible.

2.2 Gone, but Not Really: Behind the Curtain

The MIIT has observed during the course of its investigations in Stages 1 and 3 a phenomenon where employees or members of AIBA leave the internal organisational structure of AIBA but remain in the periphery, plugged in and continuing to influence the organisation from the outside.

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\(^9\) MIIT continues to come across examples of witnesses unwilling to speak because of fear.
- in effect acting behind the curtain. Bouzidi falls into that same pattern. The intimate knowledge of the members, their agendas and the relationships is valuable information for anyone seeking to step into a position of power within AIBA. Knowledge he allegedly shared with Gafur Rakhimov, his consultant who assisted in organising his presidential electoral campaign. Indeed he was even present at the November 2018 AIBA Congress and presidential elections in Moscow, following which he travelled two weeks later to the women’s World Championship in New Delhi. It is not clear to the MIIT the reasons for Bouzidi’s continued presence at Congresses and Championships without an official role.

Bouzidi had no interest in leaving the world of international boxing. Concurrent to Bouzidi’s influence in and around AIBA following his dismissal, he founded an athlete management and promotion company in 2017 with Benoit Giran, a former employee of AIBA.¹⁰ The company benefited from France’s showing at Rio. Given Bouzidi’s history of identifying talent for Dr Bessalem, this translated to this next evolution in the saga. It was a display for the record books with French boxers taking home six medals, including two gold medals going to married partners, Tony Yoka and Estelle Mosely. It was alleged that Bouzidi was priming and evaluating athletes to sign to his management company. However, without having had the opportunity to interview Bouzidi the MIIT has no evidence to confirm this.

2.3 Review of Rio Analysis into R&J scoring and Manipulation

2.3.1 Introduction

This section describes the effects of the corruption that crept into the boxing events at the Rio Summer Olympic Games. The master planner and designer as described above was undoubtedly

¹⁰ From Jun 2009 - October 2011 Giran acted as AIBA’s Sport and Development Director then from October 2011 – August 2015 he acted as AIBA Pro boxing Manager. For a short period from Jun 2010-Jun 2011 he was also WSB Sport Director.
Bouzidi. The events described above had a direct impact on the results of Rio. Bouzidi’s negotiations at the open bazaar, the control of the 5 star R&Js and intimidation of 3 star R&Js were the causes of the bout manipulation that occurred. To fulfill the Terms of Reference of Stage 1 the MIIT was required to conduct analysis on the Rio bouts. However, the necessary data and documents from various sources was provided to the MIIT with inadequate time to permit a thorough analysis before a report of Stage 1 had to be made. Thus, following on from the information obtained in Stage 1, the MIIT conducted further analysis of certain selected bouts during our Stage 3 work. The following section therefore fulfills the Terms of Reference of the Stage 1 inquiry and supports the MIIT’s findings that manipulation of bouts did occur during Rio. However, in doing so we note that the intensely subjective judging of a bout with virtually no objective standards creates a barrier to being able to state with the sufficient level of legal certainty to establish definitively that manipulation has taken place.

2.3.2 Background

The manipulation of bouts which had started in the wake of London 2012 as a rudimentary form of signalling became more sophisticated with bout outcomes often planned at the 5 star R&Js morning briefings. At Rio, these took place within the relatively secure environment of the R&J lounge. Access to this area is supposed to be restricted. Only those other officials with a direct need for access were permitted in the R&J lounge. Thus, an out of sight meeting could take place in the lounge. The 5 stars and their corrupted 3 star colleagues had the opportunity to apply pressure on others without fear of being exposed.

A witness at these gatherings reported to the MIIT that all the R&Js were present when the 5 stars pointed to the day’s forthcoming bouts. In doing so they would say that either blue or red corner should win the specific bout. The witness also reported that not all R&Js followed the 5 stars’ directions. The incorruptible R&Js however continued to use their own skill and conscience to score bouts.
The MIIT considers it likely that without the pressure placed upon the R&Js, several who officiated at Rio would not have become involved in bout manipulation. It is clear however that the 5 stars and Mik Basi in particular had the ability to influence the R&J selection process determining who would attend major competitions including Rio and qualifying tournaments. This was used as leverage to ensure that officials who complied with their instructions, and as previously reported in Stage 1, were selected while those who refused were not.

R&Js who complied did so to participate in the pinnacle of their R&J careers, while others, especially those from some of the poorer nations, relied on the per diems they received in order to support their families financially. Whatever the reason, this intimidation enabled the selection of officials for Rio to be made, to a certain extent, based on compliance not ability.

2.3.3 Results

Three different types of analysis were undertaken in an effort to discern if there was a pattern of R&J activity to the bout manipulation that was suspected of having gone on. This analysis during Stage 3 was completed with the aid of the 5 judge bouts scores, the bout timing protocols and reviews of 5 specific bouts by qualified R&Js unconnected to Rio.

For the purposes of the analysis, bouts from countries who were some of the most successful in the medal tables were selected and then reviewed across each round of the competition. Details of specific bouts analysed are not included within the Report, only the overall findings of the research. There were three main areas covered by the analysis, the results of which are recorded below.

1. To identify any bouts/rounds that appeared to have been deliberately scored closer than one would expect based on legitimate scoring criteria, thus enabling a

脚注11：The timing protocols provide details of the order in which each judge scored in each round for a specific boxer (e.g. Judge 2,3,1,5,4) and the time that elapsed between the first judge pressing his/her button and those of each subsequent judge.
predetermined boxer to win a bout, where under normal circumstances he would have lost.

Seventy-seven bouts involving four countries were selected for analysis against the official 5 judge bouts sheets. The bouts were reviewed for each boxer from the preliminary rounds until their tournament ended either with a gold medal or elimination from the competition.

Initial analysis of the seventy-seven bouts suggested that for certain bouts, including some of which the result had been widely reported as being suspicious, the winner of the bout won the first two rounds and then the loser won the third round. The initial analysis could not determine whether the third round of the bout was manipulated for the purposes for making the bout close, thus enabling the bout to be awarded to a predetermined winner without causing undue attention.

For greater clarity, the MIIT selected four bouts for review by an independent panel. The bouts selected demonstrated a similar pattern of scoring activity. The results from the independent panel confirmed that at least in these cases the loser of the bout had indeed won the last round. While this exercise confirmed for the MIIT that this type of scoring is not unusual, these results cannot be extrapolated across all bouts that show a similar pattern.

In parallel, the bouts were examined to see if any pattern emerged of R&J scoring activity. From the bouts examined, including those that were considered more suspicious than others, it was not possible to identify specific R&Js who always or predominantly scored in favour of one country or boxer.

2. To establish whether any suspicious patterns of scoring behaviour existed in relation to the seating position of a judge or the order / time delay in which judges recorded their score at the end of each round.
Initial analysis conducted in the MIIT’s Stage 1 phase of the investigation along with witness testimony, suggested that certain seating positions, possibly due to their location within the field of play, may be more advantageous than others in controlling a manipulated bout through signalling. This was tested against the timing protocols, but no pattern of seating behaviour as it related to either bout results or the order in which judges recorded their scores, could be established to support this theory.

An additional analysis was conducted in relation to judge scoring behaviour. Data was extracted for all rounds of all bouts at the Rio tournament. Patterns emerged showing that certain R&Js were consistently first to vote and never voted last, while others never voted first and always voted last. The majority as perhaps expected, were in the range in between first and last, covering various scoring time positions within the protocol list.

It was alleged that those who voted first did so to influence others and those who voted last were waiting for a signal. As it pertains to Rio, that theory could never be verified in the MIIT analysis. An explanation for these statistics is simply that some judges have a quicker cognitive response time than others or are more measured in their assessment and so record their scores consistently faster or slower than others.

There were a few anomalies in specific rounds (e.g. where a bout was stopped and restarted or a preference vote was required), but the average response time for all 5 judges to vote across all rounds of the tournament was 2.9 seconds. Scoring on average got progressively quicker as the bout progressed with an average of 3.0 seconds for the first round, 2.9 seconds for the second round and 2.8 Seconds for the third round (2.6 seconds for the fourth round in the women’s bouts).

Bouts were examined where there were timing delays of over five seconds between the first judge recording his/her score and the last. The results show that this occurred in 49 of the 273 bouts. On one occasion all three rounds of a bout had a delay of five seconds between first and
last judge scoring. On six occasions, two rounds of a bout had a similar time delay. The remaining 42 bouts had a five or more second delay in one round. A total of 18 different R&Js were associated with the delay in these 49 bouts, including two 5 stars.

The five second plus delays were identified as being in a random pattern of bouts across all rounds of the tournament and could not be specifically associated in any meaningful way, to bouts which had been the subject of manipulation concerns. Therefore, bout manipulation could not be established using this theory and analysis.

3. To conduct a review of five bouts, four relating to the Rio Olympics and one to the 2017 Men’s World Championships, to understand whether the scoring patterns that occurred at these two events were mirrored by those of three independent qualified judges.

This analysis was requested predominantly to support or reject the theory (as detailed in analysis 1 above) that bouts were deliberately called closer for the wrong boxer to be declared the winner. When examined independently by three qualified judges unconnected to the tournaments in question, the results of the bout were interesting. Of the four bouts that were examined in relation to Rio, all three judges agreed that three of the four bouts produced the incorrect winner. In the fourth bout, two of the three judges said that the winner was incorrect, while the third judge agreed with the Rio officials adding that the bout could have gone either way.

The fifth bout relating to the 2017 World Championships in Hamburg was selected for review based on a witness contention that the result had been manipulated. All three qualified judges independently reviewed the bout and stated that the outcome was correct.

Judging and thus the scoring is a wholly subjective activity for the judge. The subjectivity of the scoring without objective aspects made it impossible to establish any pattern to the scoring behaviour of judges. Furthermore, the reviewing judges only had the benefit of the official video
broadcast angle on which to base their assessment. However, even taking this into account, the findings support the general conclusion that the results of certain bouts at Rio were manipulated to produce a predetermined result.

The bouts selected for review didn’t specifically include those which caused the greatest outcry of corruption at Rio (e.g., Tishchenko v Levit and Nikitin v Conlon), so it is considered likely that further reviews of this nature would produce similar adverse findings.

2.3.4 Conclusion

There is little doubt that the manipulation of bouts took place at Rio as was described in the Stage 1 Report. However, the extent to which manipulation occurred cannot be quantified and meeting the necessary legal standards to be definitive remains elusive. The results of the analysis above do not identify any specific patterns of R&J activity that assist in identifying which officials were involved in the corruption, and in what capacity. The problem is further exacerbated because, as stated by some witnesses, the predetermined result was often the correct result so no manipulation was evident or required. These different analyses do seem to support the hypothesis that the scoring manipulation directions were carried out by oral instruction in the R&Js lounge.

Through its evidence the MIIT has concluded that by the time Rio arrived, the manipulation methodology created by the 5 star cadre had been refined. Therefore, the MIIT finds that to the extent a bout had been manipulated, the outcome of the bout had been agreed upon and directed to those involved well in advance of the bout itself and the selection of R&Js designated to officiate.

There was no longer a direct need for the prior rudimentary signalling to take place ringside in order to make on the spot decisions. That said, several witnesses have confirmed that signalling did occur at Rio and the MIIT accepts that this was likely done as a reinforcement of decisions that had been made earlier in the day. As one witness stated, there were often so many bouts
during the day, that it was difficult to remember who the 5 stars had pointed to as the predetermined winners during the earlier briefings.

Witness testimonies indicate that most if not all of the 36 R&Js (including the 5 stars) were aware of what was happening at Rio. However, for varying reasons they chose to comply or not with the directions of the 5 stars. Few have agreed to speak candidly to the MIIT about their experiences at Rio and, understandably, even less have admitted to any part in the manipulation process. This mindset will need to change if a truth and reconciliation process is to be adopted by AIBA, with the aim of reintegrating some of the officials back into the AIBA family.

The MIIT has recommended to the senior management of AIBA that the MIIT conduct a vetting and voice analysis system that was recently piloted at the 2021 World Boxing Championships in Belgrade, Serbia (See Chapter 6). The purpose of such an activity would be to determine if at least some of the R&Js and ITOs stood down after Rio might be of sufficiently low-risk to be permitted to return to the overall judging pool. Many of those individuals ask rhetorically “what did I do wrong and why am I not now used as an R&J.” They were never fired or suspended from their role nor disciplined. At least some of these R&Js could be returned to the fold of the judging pool after a risk analysis assessment by the MIIT.
CHAPTER 3: INTERREGNUM PRESIDENTS FROM WU to KREMLEV

3.1 Introduction

The departure of the Executive Director Bouzidi in 2016 and subsequently CK Wu in 2017, in different but equally inauspicious circumstances, marked the beginning of what may be termed the interregnum period of AIBA spinning out of control, embroiled in chaos with competing factions within the AIBA Executive Committee (“EC”) vying for control. The revolving door of Presidents and persistent changing of senior staff in the Executive Director (“ED”) position (now known as the Secretary General “SG” position) created an unstable organisation, deficient in its administrative role. The chaos of these different factions seeking control meant that AIBA was not attending to the rudiments of being an International Federation for the sport of boxing. That interregnum period has ceased with the emergence of the current President Umar Kremlev in December 2020. He has brought some stability to the leadership of AIBA. New senior staff are working hard at doing a proper job of administration of the sport. Indeed, the MIIT notes that the current staff have been cooperative and keen to assist the MIIT in carrying out its investigation. Moreover, AIBA has been open and receptive to proactive action to reduce corruption, such as the MIIT’s on-site pilot project during the AIBA World Boxing Championships in Belgrade, Serbia.

While the era of President CK Wu, and Chowdhry before him, were not without their own periods of turmoil and internal wrangling, those mainly related to financial mismanagement and the tolerance of corruption and deception in governing the organisation. They were, however, successful in maintaining consistent autocratic control which provided leadership by force of fear and retaliation. President Wu’s stability and staying power was in part owed to contradictory ability to be responsible for the organisation yet not responsible for the poor decisions. Any crisis that arose would be laid at the feet of his Executive Director, who would then inevitably be
dismissed. This enforced stability disappeared following the dismissal of Bouzidi and Wu’s resignation, which was more in the form of a coup than a resignation.

It is evident that Kremlev has brought in several changes and has launched a genuine process of reform. The direct result of his short tenure has been a re-stabilised organisation able to attend to the daily affairs of the sport and striving for improvement in its administration. There is a genuine attempt at reform and progress has been made under Kremlev’s leadership. There is still much to do as this Report will reveal. The real success of the new era will only be fully established when the reforms are wholly implemented and de facto stability returns with forthright leadership and proper executive administration and control. This chapter describes the individuals who were cycled in and out of the roles of President and Executive Director from the departures of CK Wu and Bouzidi; and furthermore illustrates the missing pieces of these essential elements for proper sporting administration during the interregnum period from 2017 to 2021.

3.2 An Organisation Destabilised from the Top

This destabilisation of senior management and officials of the organisation had a negative impact on some of the key functions of administration and finance. This directly impacted the proper functioning of competitions producing the conditions and opportunity for the manipulation of bout results by unethical and corrupted officials to flourish (See Chapter 4). This situation eventually forced the IOC to investigate and ultimately to take charge of boxing during the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. In so doing it was forced in 2019 to suspend the recognition of AIBA as the international federation with recognition under the Olympic Charter by the IOC as the IF for boxing worldwide.

The following table shows the frequent changes in the key AIBA leadership positions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ching-Kuo Wu</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>3 November 2006 Re-elected 2 November 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; 14 November 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Kim</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>3 November 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Kim</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Dismissed</td>
<td>8 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karim Bouzidi</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>9 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Louis Marie</td>
<td>Acting Executive Director</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karim Bouzidi</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Dismissed</td>
<td>17 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco Falcinelli</td>
<td>Interim President</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>9 October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching-Kuo Wu</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>9 November 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Louis Marie</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>3 March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Louis Marie</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>20 October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry Smith, Mohamed</td>
<td>AIBA IMC – AIBA Administrators on rotation performing Executive Directors role</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>20 October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moustahsane and Pat Fiacco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco Falcinelli</td>
<td>Interim President</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>27 January 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafur Rahimov</td>
<td>Interim President</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>27 January 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Virgets</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>27 January 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafur Rahimov</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>2 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafur Rahimov</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>15 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Moustahsane</td>
<td>Interim President</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>15 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Virgets</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Dismissed</td>
<td>31 August 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar Kremlev</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>12 December 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istvan Kovacs</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>22 March 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A precursor to what was to follow in future destabilising steps during the interregnum period arose from the wrongful dismissal of Ho Kim as the Secretary General (“SG”) in 2015. That action
was followed by the attempt to contain the fallout from the bout manipulation at the Summer Olympic Games at Rio (“Rio”) by initially moving and later dismissing in September 2016 Bouzidi, the facilitator of much of the match-manipulation corruption of Rio. The interregnum period began.

The first senior position of Acting Executive Director in 2016 made permanent in 2017 was filled by William Louis Marie. He was appointed by President Wu and had been the former Head of Communications before his promotion. Louis Marie was the architect of the plan to stand down the all the alleged bad actors from Rio to save the image of the organisation, which included Bouzidi. This ingratiated him with President Wu and the promotion to ED was the natural next step despite the lack of high level administrative and management experience in international federations. His stay in the position lasted thirteen months when he resigned on 20 October 2017, a few weeks before the enforced resignation of President Wu. He had been a loyal supporter of the President and was not willing to continue in the position after the forced resignation of the President.

President Wu’s decisive removal of Bouzidi could not spare Wu however and in just over a year following Bouzidi’s dismissal, President Wu resigned. The last months of CK Wu’s reign were dogged by attempts to have him removed as President when the scale of his financial mismanagement and alleged corruption in relation to three major loans became public. Until then, President Wu had managed to keep all these agreements concealed even from the Executive Committee (“EC”). The details of his financial entanglements were only fully known by his former Executive Director Ho Kim, who had been party to their creation but was dismissed by the President in June 2015. As the concealment of AIBA’s indebtedness became more widely known, the calls for his resignation became louder. The process of destabilisation and focus on different factions taking power was underway. While this turmoil was ongoing the corrupt patterns of the past thrived in the ring under the wobbling leadership and lack of proper organisational controls.
On the verge of potential bankruptcy, on 25 September 2017, the AIBA IMC held a meeting in Albena, Bulgaria attended by the representatives of the companies who had agreed the loans, along with Ho Kim and other former AIBA employees who had become embroiled in the affair. It was clear during this meeting that legal action against AIBA was being considered by all these companies for the return of their investment. Failure to address the issues outside of court would likely result in the organisation being bankrupted. According to one EC member, they were told that Louis Marie had negotiated favourable repayment terms for the $10M USD loan/investment from the Azerbaijani company, Benkons. The alleged new contract would buy the organisation at least eight years to repay the loan. This agreement, however, was categorically denied by the Benkons representative attending the meeting. This suggests that even at this stage of impending bankruptcy, AIBA senior staff under President Wu’s direction were still attempting to keep the EC uninformed.

Behind the scenes, certain disgruntled EC members aligned to in their efforts to remove President Wu. As a first step, some months prior to his resignation the disgruntled faction of EC members formed the Interim Management Committee (“IMC”). The IMC proceeded to organise a vote of no confidence motion against President Wu for the alleged mismanagement of the organisation’s finances which the EC overwhelmingly approved. He was suspended on 9 October 2017. The EC believed they had the authority to take this action under the terms of the constitution. President Wu disagreed, and challenged this suspension in the Swiss courts, eventually winning the case. However, by this stage his days in charge were numbered.

Wu had continually refused to resign from his position as President and refuted the allegations made by many within the EC. He reluctantly accepted on the condition the AIBA EC would propose his nomination as an AIBA Honorary President at the forthcoming Extraordinary Congress. This did not happen. Later he lost his much-cherished IOC membership.
The replacement by appointment was made in disregard of the requirement that the first ranked Vice-President, Osvaldo Bisbal, should have become the Interim President. Instead, Franco Falcinelli was the appointed Interim President on a temporary basis following his leadership in the IMC calling for Wu’s resignation. A few days after Falcinelli’s appointment, Louis Marie resigned from his position as Executive Director. Instead of directly appointing a new Executive Director, exceptionally, the ED role was filled by three representatives of the AIBA: IMC Terry Smith, Mohamed Moustahsane and Pat Fiacco, who managed the duties of ED in turn. This triumvirate ED experiment however quickly failed as each of the three started competing against each other jockeying for position to take over the role. The destabilisation of the organisation was mounting quickly and the rules and regulations of the organisation were ignored in the power struggles that followed.

The IOC had been following the growing crisis within AIBA and nearing the end of Falcinelli’s term in correspondence dated the 6 December 2017, the IOC Executive Board requested specific steps to be taken by AIBA in view of serious concerns related to governance and financial stability. In that regard, Falcinelli soon after received a letter from Christophe De Kepper, the IOC Director General which listed all the requirements for good governance to be fulfilled by the end of January 2018 to ensure that AIBA remained in charge of boxing as an Olympic sport. The correspondence focused on the requirements including governance, management, financial, sporting integrity, and anti-doping.

Falcinelli’s appointment, however, was merely for the sake of appearance. As a condition of his appointment he agreed to step aside when the time came, allowing the next President to take control. Despite requests for Falcinelli to remain President, when the time came, he did as he promised and stepped aside, fearing that if he did not keep his promise to do so harm would come to him or his family. He announced his resignation during the Extraordinary Congress held on 27 January 2018 in Dubai. During the Congress he also announced that that Ho Kim was not guilty and that all accusations against Ho Kim had now been cleared.
The Uzbek, Gafur Rahimov, was appointed the new Interim President. He had been manoeuvring for some months behind the scenes with the assistance of Bouzidi and other members of the IMC to remove CK Wu and subsequently take over from Falcinelli. Once again, the rules of the organisation were ignored as Rahimov was not the first ranking Vice-President. During the congress, Rahimov appointed Tom Virgets as the new permanent Executive Director. This was Rahimov’s strategic self-serving appointment, hoping that with Virget’s role with the US Navy, he could somehow influence the US Government to remove him from the sanctions list. The behind the curtain manoeuvring by Bouzidi illustrates the phenomenon of former AIBA officials who were outside actors continuing to have significant influence over the organisation. Indeed, there are photographs of Bouzidi being present at the Women’s World Championships in New Delhi, India two weeks following the Congress, where he had no official business or reason to be there. See picture below with Bouzidi on the right.

Between Rahimov’s appointment as Interim President and the congressional elections due in November 2018, there was considerable manoeuvring by him to gain support for his presidential election campaign. It was clear at this stage however that the IOC leadership had serious concerns over his candidature mainly due to him being on the US Treasury Department sanctions list, and it was clear they would never support him.
On 5 February 2018, after having reviewed AIBA’s progress report dated 31 January 2018, the IOC EB again highlighted significant concerns regarding said report and developments within AIBA and therefore decided: (i) to open an investigation into governance of AIBA; (ii) to suspend any financial payment to AIBA; and (iii) to freeze all contacts with AIBA. A further update report on progress was required.

In a series of correspondence from May 2018 until November 2018, the IOC requested that AIBA address concerns in areas of governance, finance, and anti-doping. AIBA provided three additional progress reports on 6 and 16 July and 12 November 2018. Following each progress report, the IOC responded that AIBA had not adequately addressed the above concerns. In addition, on 31 August 2018, Paquerette Girard Zapelli, IOC Ethics and Compliance Officer, sent a letter to AIBA referring to allegations surrounding Rahimov, that stated it would be crucial and in the best interests of boxing within the Olympic Movement, that only candidates with a clean background stand for the President’s position. Finally in correspondence of 3 October, the IOC reiterated that given that the governance issues had not been properly addressed, boxing risked expulsion from the Olympic program and AIBA a loss of IOC recognition.

Despite the above concerns, on 2 November 2018, Gafur Rahimov was elected as the new AIBA President; after which the IOC issued a statement that it would discuss the status of AIBA and the position of Olympic boxing at the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games during its next EB meeting due to take place from 30 November to 2 December 2018.

On 30 November 2018, after having acknowledged AIBA’s progress and commitments, the IOC EB noted that several points of significant concern remained in the areas of governance, ethics, finance management and refereeing & judging; it also took note of the election of Gafur Rahimov as the new AIBA President and expressed its ongoing concerns. Consequently, the IOC EB decided to take additional measures and steps, including to mandate an IOC Inquiry Committee ("IOC-IC") (Chaired by Nenad Lalovic,) and to freeze the planning of the boxing tournament for the
Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. That action preserved the ability of boxing athletes who had trained for Tokyo to be able to compete but not under the International Federation. The action also fuelled the continued destabilisation within AIBA.

On 21 May 2019, the IOC-IC issued its report, where insufficient basic third-party due diligence and background checks were some of the criticised issues, especially with regard to the fact that two Swiss banks decided to close AIBA’s accounts (The Banque Cantonale Vaudoise mentioned it was due to reputational risk of being associated with a governing body led by Gafur Rahimov). Consequently, no other financial establishment in Switzerland agreed to open new accounts, and AIBA used the services of a Serbian bank linked with the Russian VTB Group which is subject to US sanctions.

The IOC-IC report recommended the following:

i. To suspend IOC recognition of AIBA until sustainable improvements would be made in areas of governance, ethics, refereeing & judging as well as financial stability and going concern, and

ii. To allow, on an exceptional basis and given specific circumstances, the IOC EB to develop a solution that would allow athletes of Olympic boxing to attend qualification events and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games

This resulted in AIBA’s suspension as of 22 May 2019 as the Olympic governing body for boxing and a special taskforce chaired by International Gymnastics Federation President and IOC member Morinari Watanabe (also tasked with organizing the qualification system) was established by the IOC.

Due to the strong opposition from the IOC, Rahimov decided to step down on 15 July 2019. He was replaced by a new Interim President, AIBA VP Mohamed Moustahsane, who the MIIT had reported on in Stage 1, as being highly suspect for his involvement in manipulating bouts at the
2016 Rio Olympics. This appointment was achieved by the agreement of several Vice-President’s and Rahimov who was seeking to remove his name from the US sanctions list. Moustahsane was in fact a puppet President, doing everything possible to skirt the rules and delay the upcoming Congress until Rahimov could clear his name and come back “clean” as President. Moustahsane dismissed Tom Virgets from his position as Executive Director on 31 August 2019. Virgets had previously been chairman of the SIC charged with investigating the allegations of corruption at Rio. The position remained vacant until the current Secretary General, Istvan Kovacs, was appointed on 22 March 2021.

On 14 December 2020, following a virtual AIBA Congress, Umar Kremlev was elected the new President.

3.3 Conclusion

There was a complete breakdown in the continuity of two of the most important positions within AIBA for nearly four years during the interregnum period from 2016 to 2020. Even when the positions were filled, they were either on an interim or acting basis and contrary to the rules of the organisation, so the appointed individuals were not able to make any long-term impact. Also, it appears that there was considerable manoeuvring behind the scenes in order for one group or another to achieve supremacy at the head of the organisation. It is not surprising therefore that during this period there was no real leadership and as a result, key areas of governance and administration suffered through lack of management and expertise, along with a loss of control over the finances which was reaching an ever more dire position.

This lack of cohesive leadership during the turbulent post Rio years directly mirrors the corruption and manipulation which continued to flourish to the detriment of the sport. By the beginning of 2018, the organisation was in such disarray that the IOC was forced to step in to restore some order, making demands for visible improvement if AIBA was to remain in charge of
boxing as an Olympic sport. It was little surprise that governance reforms requested were not sufficient to satisfy the IOC and as a result AIBA was suspended as the Olympic governing body for boxing.

With the election of Umar Kremlev and the appointment of other key personnel in leadership roles, there are now real signs of improvement. Umar Kremlev stated his commitment to reform the organisation at all levels and many will be watching close to see if these promises are delivered.

AIBA has and is still working diligently to satisfy the IOC’s requirements. In that respect, Umar Kremlev appointed a Governance Reform Group chaired by Prof. Ulrich Haas to provide recommendations to improve AIBA’s governance and McLaren Global Sport Solution to investigate issues such as refereeing & judging, corruption, manipulation and past AIBA management. The acceptance of the recommendations detailed in these reports will be foundational to AIBA’s future progress in reform.
Chapter 4: Corruption Patterns of the Past Continue Post Rio; what we can identify

4.1 Introduction

The suspension of the Executive Director, the 5 stars, and the 3 star judges that officiated at Rio created a power vacuum within AIBA. The leaders of the manipulation schemes were physically out of the field of play but their legacy of manipulation remained, albeit in a less organised and centralised fashion. The vacuum appears to have been filled by smaller factions or cliques of officials who had strong relationships and could work to benefit one another. As an added layer, in the previous chapter the MIIT discussed the lack of continuity within AIBA leadership after the dismissal of President Wu. The revolving door of AIBA Presidents and the continued presence and influence of the former Executive Directors from behind the curtain created the ideal conditions for the corruption to continue in its various forms.

The MIIT was asked by AIBA and the IOC to investigate specific AIBA and European and Asian Confederation tournaments where incidents of corruption were alleged. Through its investigation and the intelligence gathered on the ground at the launch of the pilot vetting process at the Belgrade World Boxing Championships in October 2021, the MIIT added several tournaments to those requested by AIBA and the IOC. This chapter sets out information obtained for the tournaments reviewed, where possible the systems of manipulation being used, individuals involved and the findings that the MIIT has reached.

While it is apparent that problems regarding officiating continued to persist at competitions, the MIIT’s assessment does not go into specific detail regarding all tournaments or specific bouts. In some instances confidential witnesses described to the MIIT unethical activities that they witnessed but could not remember enough details about the circumstances. This intelligence has not been investigated, nor the allegations substantiated, but have been included to illustrate that concerns about corruption have persisted in many competitions throughout the post Rio era. The MIIT seeks to highlight these types of alleged corruption, thus enabling similar modus operandi
to be identified in the future, enabling AIBA to put measures in place to mitigate the risk of future occurrences. This information will be of assistance in making operational some of the Governance Reform Group (“GRG”) recommendations made by the team of Professor Hass.

4.2 Corruption Methodologies and Motivations Observed

For the period from 2016 to 2021 the MIIT has reviewed intelligence and conducted its own evidence gathering of eight tournaments. What emerged were patterns of manipulation throughout each of those events. The methods identified are a combination of the following: pre-bout instructions to support particular boxers amongst language blocs of R&Js (“cliques”), i.e. Russian, Spanish or English-speaking officials; ringside signalling amongst corrupted officials indicating which corner to vote for; pressuring non-corrupted or susceptible R&Js to score in favour of countries boxer; and intimidation of R&Js and ITOs from both corrupt officials and external groups such as National Federations or Olympic Committees.

Motivation to engage in this behaviour has varied between R&Js. There is often not one single reason or explanation which has caused the MIIT difficulty to fully establish the reasons for specific bouts being manipulated. The bouts may be manipulated for various reasons. However, the MIIT’s evidence suggests that the following are most likely motivators:

- **Financial reward** - This could be in the form of cash, gifts or other favours bestowed on the corrupt officials from varying sources to ensure the favourable outcome of bouts. Instances of financial benefits have come from other R&Js, from external figures, AIBA members, National Federations and National Olympic Committees.

- **Nationalism** – Officials group together to support each other in specific bouts. Through the MIIT’s interviews and evidence gathering it can establish that the R&Js from Russian speaking former soviet states and their allies have created small cliques of officials that work to support one another. The MIIT notes that this does not extend to all Russian
speaking officials, and some have actively tried to not associate with the Russian speaking cliques. The MIIT has also observed this phenomenon with French speaking officials from northern Africa, as well as English speaking officials from the Commonwealth. Virtually all nation’s governments financially reward their National Sporting Federations based upon their medal success. This provides a powerful incentive to ensure victory by any method possible including manipulation. By sticking together in cliques (as described above), the chances of success are significantly increased. However, coercion and intimidation of other R&Js/ITO's is often necessary to achieve the desired manipulation.

- **Betting Scams** – Criminal syndicates have long been associated with martial arts/combat sports and due to its heritage, boxing has been a victim of their activities. Through its work on site at the Belgrade World Boxing Championships the MIIT collected evidence that betting scams orchestrated by individuals and/or criminal groups are perhaps more prevalent than previously thought. More work needs to be conducted in this area to determine the precise systems and methods in place. The MIIT has evidence, however, that external individuals are pressuring officials to manipulate bouts. These groups have no specific allegiances and are often willing to sacrifice even their own nation's boxers in order to benefit financially from the match-fixing. Rather than coercion, threats and intimidation are the methods most often employed in order to achieve the required outcomes.

4.3 Reports on Bout Manipulation for Specific Competitions

4.3.1 Covert Signalling and Verbal Pressure at World Youth Championships Saint Petersburg, Russia

In November 2016, with the dust having yet to settle from what occurred at Rio, new allegations of bout manipulation were raised at the World Youth Boxing Championships in St Petersburg.
There were allegedly attempts made by the tournament’s Deputy Supervisor (“DS”), to pressure R&Js to manipulate bout results by scoring in favour of certain countries.

A 3 Star R&J verbally reported to Ray Silvas three incidents where the DS pressured the official to manipulate a bout. The allegations were later corroborated by another R&J who experienced similar pressure from the DS. The MIIT considers it possible by those reviewing the complaint that other R&Js had also been approached. However, the MIIT could not find sufficient evidence to determine that this situation was established. The R&J reported that the DS had both signalled and verbally directed the R&Js in relation to three bouts. Two of the incidents related to Kazakh and Ukrainian boxers for which the official was pressured to vote in favour. The official (witness) could not remember the countries involved in the third bout.

The MIIT notes that during the Stage 1 and Stage 3 phases of this investigation, the MIIT’s witnesses, both confidential and open, had concerns regarding the same DS in relation to his continuous attempts to corrupt officials and pressure them to manipulate bouts. A number have expressed fear of reprisal for not submitting to the pressures placed upon them or by speaking out against the corruption. One witness reported that he would be ‘dead’ if it became known that he had spoken out against the DS. Another intimated that the DS was facilitating the manipulation of bouts on behalf of criminal groups linked to the former soviet states. The MIIT has not been able to substantiate these allegations. Yet another confidential witness recently stated that he has harboured concerns about the DS since he first met him over five years ago, “but it's been going on ever since then, it's always the same”. The witness could not recall the specific events, but stated that “unfortunately, every time he turns up, it's bad news”. The witness clarified this by saying that the DS’ interaction with R&Js mainly from the former soviet states, led to “the results going in the wrong direction.”

The two R&Js complained to the Supervisor of the tournament Ray Silvas, who brought it to the attention of the Disciplinary Committee. They prepared written statements stating they were subjected to pressure and intimidation. Ray Silvas, Supervisor and member of SIC, led an internal
ad hoc review of the allegations. He interviewed the DS in the presence of Phillipe Tuccelli (the former Sports Director) during which the DS denied all the allegations. It is clear, however, from Silvas’s report of the interview that he had prior concerns about the DS’ activities. Despite Silvas’ longstanding concerns, the DS had previously been allowed to continue as a senior official attending various tournaments. However, at the St Petersburg competition, the DS was removed from the competition and had his accreditation revoked. He subsequently requested, privately, that Tuccelli provide him VIP access. This was denied. He was, however, allowed to remain at the tournament after telling Silvas that he was responsible for the wellbeing of a boxer of the same nationality whose coach had departed the tournament early. In the view of the MIIT he ought to have been sent home. It is a further illustration of the failure of the AIBA disciplinary process. See Chapter 5.

Silvas recommended that his investigation report be submitted to the then Acting Executive Director William Louis-Marie and the AIBA Legal Department, requesting that a complaint be prepared and submitted to the Disciplinary Commission. The resulting investigation report was reviewed by AIBA legal counsel at the time, Serge Vittoz, who wrote there was “sufficient elements to submit the case to the Disciplinary Commission.”¹² A senior AIBA official recommended the matter proceed to the Disciplinary Commission, which ultimately resulted in no action.

The Disciplinary Commission found that the DS had behaved inappropriately in his position. However, despite the accusations of “two highly trusted and competent AIBA R&Js”, the DS’ ‘inappropriate’ behaviour was found not to meet the standard required to be disciplined under a manipulation violation. He did not therefore breach the disciplinary code and was not sanctioned. The Disciplinary Commission recommended that the DS attend remedial training before being allowed to assume an AIBA leadership role. The MIIT has not found any evidence that demonstrates that the DS completed the required remedial training, but the DS has been back in a senior ITO role since at least since 2018. The MIIT has heard from several confidential

¹² AIBA771 - 2017_01_17 - Email from CPV Serge Vittoz to Ph. Tuccelli on St Petersburg DS.
witnesses which allege that he remains active in bout manipulation. However, the MIIT has not been able to confirm the veracity of those allegations; a further example of the failure of the Disciplinary Commission fulfilling its role.

In reviewing the Disciplinary file, the MIIT finds that the conflict of interest which AIBA officials enabled when the DS could stay at the event to “accompany” a boxer of the same nationality, from his own National Federation, whose coach had left, was completely unacceptable. AIBA officials succumbed to his request to remain at the tournament, where his ability to influence the outcome of bouts through contact with corrupted R&Js was a real threat. The MIIT recommends that once an investigation action is taken against an official during a tournament that the official be escorted out of the venue, accreditation revoked, and put on the first flight available to their home jurisdiction while they await any further disciplinary action.

4.3.2 Covert Signalling and Verbal Pressure at World Championships Hamburg, Germany - August 2017

The World Boxing Championships in Hamburg, Germany in August 2017 was not originally a tournament that was requested by AIBA for the MIIT to investigate. Through the MIIT’s interviews with witnesses it learned that there were several bout results with allegedly questionable results. An R&J who requested to remain confidential for fear of retribution, stated that after the bout lists had been posted in the R&J lounge, he had been approached by an R&J from Azerbaijan who attempted to influence his scoring by stating that his country had the better boxer. The inference clearly being that the R&J should score the bout in favour of his country’s boxer.

In another instance, the same confidential R&J was approached by the R&J from Belarus,\(^\text{13}\) who told him prior to a specific bout to watch for his signal. The confidential R&J confirmed to the MIIT that

\[^{13}\text{Unrelated to this tournament some other of the MIIT’s witnesses have stated that the Belorussian R&J had been involved with a group of corrupt R&Js, who, up until Rio, had been controlled by the 5 star R&J, Vladislav Malyshev.}\]
MIIT that during the bout, the Belarussian official was signalling with his eyes to a certain corner. The witness could not recall the exact details of the bout in question but remembered that the boxer that he was being pressured to favour was Cuban. The source did not report these approaches for fear of retribution, which he added was a concern that affected many of the officials, not just in this tournament.

4.3.3 Overt Intimidation from National Federations at Pan Am Games, Lima, Peru July 2019

The MIIT has included this tournament to demonstrate a phenomenon which AIBA has fought against and made reforms to avoid happening, but seemingly continues in various forms – the intimidation of R&Js or ITOs by National Federations. In one case, a President of a National Federation verbally criticises the judge’s decisions on the bouts. He then criticised the decision of the judges on social media. These actions amount to interference by exerting mental pressure. Information obtained regarding this tournament identifies the open and direct pressure, both mental and/or physical, that R&Js and ITOs can experienced from National Federations.

This case involves pressure being placed upon both R&J officials and the Technical Delegate (TD) during the Pan Am games by representatives of various National Federations. The TD is an important leadership role in which there is de facto overall control or influence over the whole tournament. In the opinion of the MIIT, if a key and influential leadership person succumbs to external pressures and fails to stand up against intimidation, then it is considered likely that many of those subordinate to the leadership person will follow suit when in the same situation.

The TD filed a post-tournament report which described three incidents where the NF’s representatives acted wrongly. Two incidents related two NFs verbally attacking the TD after their boxers lost their respective bouts.¹⁴ In one instance involving the Colombian Boxing Federation’s President, the attacks were so violent that he was removed from the tournament and his accreditation revoked. One of the NF’s representatives later admitted that his behaviour

¹⁴ The Nicaragua Boxing Federation’s President suggested the TD directed officials to score against his boxer.
was because his government only pays his Federation if they win medals and that was all that mattered to him. While these two incidents are not examples of corruption or manipulation, they do illustrate why the NFs have historically, and potentially continued to pressure and bribe any R&Js thought to be susceptible in order to obtain favourable results. NFs are frequently searching for payments from either their governments or National Olympic Committees for funding. In some cases that funding is results dependent, i.e. medals. Without results, there is no funding. Therefore, robust financial benefits of the NF are tied directly to their tournament results. The MIIT has examples of certain NFs that have colluded with, bribed and pressured their way to achieve the necessary results to obtain funding.

In the final incident at the Lima, Peru Pan Am Games, the Cuban Boxing Federation’s President requested that the TD not assign the American R&J to officiate any of the Cuban boxer’s bouts. This request would be based on the neutrality principle used by the Draw Commission to select R&Js for the bout. A first request was written, while a second request was verbal which, according to the TD, became violent when the President grabbed the arm of the TD in what he believed was an attempt to intimidate him. An AIBA ITO from Cuba separately joined in the row, supporting the Cuban Federation’s President against the TD. He stated that he was an employee of the Cuba Boxing Federation first and foremost and only secondly an AIBA ITO. An illustration of misplaced loyalties at a multi games sporting competition.

This type of pressure to change R&J appointments is tantamount to manipulation in the form of interference in the work of the Draw Commission which is attempted to be brought about through intimidation exerted by National Federations. The MIIT concludes that a TD who is not a strong person in standing up to intimidations would likely have succumbed to this pressure. It is an illustration of the need to have strong leadership training of the TDs at competitions to assist in resisting any attempt at similar tactics to those described above in order to gain advantage for their respective boxers.
The actions of the Cuban ITO at Lima reinforce the need for a review of the appointment criteria for ITOs officiating at international events. It is recommended that in order to be an International Technical Official you cannot be: (i) National Federation President or EC member, or (ii) National Federation Employee. These changes will prevent any political interference on the Field of Play which currently exists and was clearly demonstrated at the Pan Am games in Lima. This would reduce the likelihood that these individuals will attempt to influence the outcome of bouts in favour of their National Federations or allies.

4.3.4 Verbal Pressure at Asia/Oceania Olympic Games Qualifier Amman, Jordan – March 2020

The same confidential R&J source who was pressured to manipulate bouts at the Hamburg World Championships was again approached by the R&J from Azerbaijan at the Olympic qualifier in Jordan. The confidential witness asked this R&J if he was cheating in order to make money. This R&J intimated that money was available should it be required to secure the witness’ vote. According to the witness, the R&J was removed from the competition by the IOC Boxing Task Force, his assumption being that someone else had reported him for similar corrupt activities.

4.3.5 Pre-Bout Collusion, Covert Signalling on FOP and Pressuring R&Js Youth World Championships Kielce, Poland April 2021

The Youth World Boxing Championships was not a tournament that either AIBA or the IOC asked the MIIT to investigate. The MIIT added it to its docket of tournaments as result of the intelligence it gathered while performing the R&J vetting process at the Belgrade World Boxing Championships. Certain R&Js who witnessed the events in Poland came to Belgrade with the intention to disclose to the MIIT their experience and allegations concerning bout manipulations by R&Js at the 2021 Youth World Boxing Championships. Without being present on site as a neutral party available to speak with attendees at Belgrade, it is questionable whether this intelligence would have been brought forward.
The allegations of manipulation in Poland were made by five witness R&Js in relation to R&Js from Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Israel. R&Js from other countries including Kazakhstan and Latvia were also mentioned within the complaints, but these were not properly investigated by AIBA. The allegations were based on significant concerns that R&Js from the above countries were colluding to support certain boxers. According to the written complaint, the methodology in place was threefold: (i) prior verbal communication in the R&J lounge of the predetermined outcome to those R&Js in the inner group; (ii) signalling to ringside R&Js with their eyes at the end of each round; and (iii) pressuring R&Js outside of their clique to score as they directed. What appears to have occurred in Poland is a very clear example of the way in which the legacy of the vanquished ED, Karim Bouzidi, and the 5 stars was filled by a clique of Russian speaking R&Js who attempted to manipulate certain bouts.

The incidents were witnessed by R&Js at the tournament who refused to be corrupted. Witnesses who spoke to the MIIT indicated that the tournament’s Technical Delegate and Observer also had concerns regarding potential corruption. The former had warned a group of R&Js earlier in the tournament not to favour their respective countries’ competitors, while the latter had told one witness that he had also observed R&Js giving eye signals.

AIBA requested the five R&Js concerned provide written statements regarding what they witnessed. Their statements were submitted to AIBA senior personnel present at the event. One witness wrote:

“It has come to my attention that a number of my fellow R/J colleagues are using their influence to gain favour for their boxers competing in the championships. Their actions at ringside are a matter for observation as they are using eye contact to indicate which boxer to declare the winner of each round and eventual bout.”

Another wrote “The activities they do is approaching us and whispering to score in favour of certain countries....inflicting mental pressure and moral harm which is not healthy for our sport.”
Lastly, another recounted a gathering after a day’s officiating, where one of the alleged corrupt R&Js toasted his colleagues saying, “*Even though when we are boxing in a tournament it is political, here it is just friends.*” Such a statement appears to the MIIT to mean and suggest that everyone is friends after the day's work of judging but supporting their own countries or allies when working ringside.

Finally, the witnesses also allege that the ITO acting as R&J evaluator behaved in contravention of the AIBA code of ethics. One of the five R&Js was referring to a quarterfinal bout with a Moldovan boxer to whom he issued a warning. The ITO, also being from Moldova, chastised the R&J for doing so. It is not clear to the MIIT why an R&J evaluator would be appointed to a bout where his own countryman was boxing, as there is a clear risk of a conflict of interest.

The MIIT has unfortunately not had the opportunity to complete a full evaluation of this tournament given that it was as a result of intelligence the MIIT collected independently from its on-site work at the World Boxing Championships in Belgrade, Serbia that it was included in Stage 3. The MIIT has taken a preliminary review of four quarterfinal bouts which the witnesses described to the MIIT as suspicious. All boxers advancing after a quarterfinal bout are guaranteed a medal. These bouts are:

1. 296 (POL v RUS)
2. 299 (ARM v ITA)
3. 316 (UZB v COL)
4. 318 (MDA v CUB)

The first three bouts were all split decisions, won by a 3:2 margin. According to a senior AIBA representative, the above suspicious bouts were not subjected to an assessment as part of any investigation process.
The MIIT has received the bout sheets and has conducted a preliminary review thereof. Upon initial examination, the bout sheets showed that the R&Js accused of manipulation always voted together for the same boxer, sometimes with significantly different scores to that of the other three judges. For example, Bout 318, which was a 0:4 victory to CUB, involved the alleged chastising of one of the witness R&Js by the Moldovan ITO (R&J evaluator). This bout appeared to be a clear win for the Cuban boxer, however despite this, and even with a warning issued to the Moldovan boxer, the Armenian judge still scored the bout as a 28:28 draw.

The MIIT accepts the subjective nature of officiating a bout and that as result there will exist at times differences between R&Js in their scoring. However, it is evident in this example that the Armenian judge is an outlier. When considering the penalty awarded to the R&J witness, the other judges scored as far apart as 25:30 in favour of the Cuban boxer. The Armenian judge’s scoring behaviour as well as the other judges alleged to have colluded, suggests that voting was being undertaken as part of a pre-arranged agreement between officials of the former soviet state bloc.

A fair outcome of the bouts is very important to establish for the integrity of the competition. However, if there are allegations of manipulation it is important that accusers and the accused can expect a full and complete investigation. That investigation must be nonpartisan and undertaken in a fair process and procedures such that everyone accepts that justice has been done.

4.3.6 AIBA’s Action Taken

The complaint was sent to and reviewed by AIBA’s internal counsel during the tournament. One interview was conducted and some additional limited research was undertaken. Following which internal counsel recommended that in order to maintain the integrity of the event, the R&Js against whom the allegations had been made should be immediately removed from the event and have their accreditation revoked until an official investigation could be conducted. However, no official investigation was instigated. The internal decision was that there was insufficient
evidence to apply to the Disciplinary Committee through the EC for provisional suspension. The allegations were not pursued and it is another example of the organisation’s administrative processes not functioning properly.

The removal of the accreditation of the four R&Js alleged of bout manipulation was not pursued and they could remain at the competition. They continued to officiate right up to and including the finals. Despite the witness statements provided to AIBA, nothing was in fact done to ensure the integrity of the competition as recommended by counsel. The MIIT has interviewed AIBA personnel regarding the process and procedures followed receipt of this complaint. It is evident from those discussions that further avenues could have been explored in order to better assess the validity of the serious allegations which had been raised in relation to bout manipulation. In the final chapter of this Report, the MIIT recommends processes and procedures to give AIBA greater control and that will reinforce the protections and integrity of the R&Js and the ITOs.

It should also be noted that two R&Js who were identified as high-risk at the October 2021 World Boxing Championships in Belgrade had also been appointed to officiate at this tournament.

The AIBA personnel charged with these responsibilities lack the time, and perhaps more importantly the necessary expertise, to properly pursue these cases to their final conclusion. This is an area of concern that AIBA recognises, and which needs to be addressed going forward through a dedicated integrity unit, the creation of which has already been announced, along with other governance reforms.

That said, a positive sign is that ethical R&Js now appear to be developing confidence in specific individuals within the organisation to report incidents of corruption, something that was clearly lacking at Rio. If they are prepared to stand up and be counted in an environment that may still appear hostile and threatening, it is incumbent on all those charged with reviewing their complaints, to ensure that a thorough investigation is undertaken.
4.3.7 Asian Amateur Boxing Championships – Dubai, UAE May 2021

Several corruption allegations against officials were raised during and post the Asian Championships in Dubai requiring AIBA to release a statement on 2nd June stating that the Refereeing and Judging (R&J) Committee would conduct an immediate investigation into the work of all relevant appointed officials to determine whether any incorrect decisions were taken due to lack of competence, manipulation, or corruption. AIBA requested the MIIT conduct the investigation into the allegations. This added task to the MIIT Terms of Reference (“TOR”) resulted in this Stage 3 investigation and Stage 3 Report; and that it be done in advance of what is described as Stage 2 in the TOR.

The following separate areas of concern were identified:

1. Bout Reviews

According to the observer’s report, during this tournament there were 11 bout protest reviews submitted. Due to the competitive nature of the tournament and quality of the boxers, there were several close decisions which could have gone either way. After consultation with the bout review jury, it was decided by the Technical Delegate that of the 11 bout reviews lodged, three would be accepted for review. One of the three original decisions were overturned while the other two were upheld. Except for Kazakhstan, no other complaints were received as a result of this process.

On 19 May 2021, AIBA sent out an amendment of AIBA Technical & Competition Rules of 24 October 2020 sections 20.4.10 and 20.4.11. It was these rules that were followed by officials during the Dubai 2021 Youth World Championships. The amended rules stated that the TD will consult with the observer and the two evaluators and then decide on whether to accept the bout for review or not. If the observer and two evaluators unanimously agree that the bout should be reviewed, then the TD will consider that. If they do not agree that it should be reviewed, the TD will consider that as well. The additional detail in the rules may reduce the likelihood of any
ambiguity. However, those involved in this process explained that if the evaluators scores are in alignment with the judges, then the bout won’t be accepted for review.

Kazakhstan submitted two bout reviews for the women’s competition, these being Bout 77 and Bout 86. One of these had the original decision upheld and the other overturned. Kazakhstan also submitted four bout reviews for the men’s competition, these being Bouts 65, 126, 127, and 129. In Bout 65, KAZ vs IRI, and Bout 126, KAZ vs UZB, the Jury agreed with the original decision. At this point, Kazakhstan had used up their two available protest reviews. Bout 127 (KAZ vs UZB) was reviewed and overturned. It was however a mistake to review this bout, as Kazakhstan has already used up their two-bout review quota. The rules make it clear that only two failed bout reviews will be accepted, so the decision could not be reversed, and the win for UZB was upheld.

Kazakhstan also submitted a review for Bout 129 but the review was not accepted as they had already achieved their maximum permitted reviews. Kazakhstan sent a complaint to AIBA stating they had used up two of their three available protests quota; they then lodged three further protests in quick succession, these being at 19:53, 20:07 and 20:40 on 31 May. It is clear from their complaint letter that they wanted to know which bout would be reviewed, so they could cherry pick the one most likely to be successful. As would be expected, the panel reviewed the first of those they received on that date (at 19:53), the original result of which was upheld.

It is not within the capacities of the MIIT to review the bout results that were upheld and overturned, nor is it considered necessary. However, it is noted that despite one result being overturned there had been no suggestion from other quarters of bout manipulation linked to the review process. This therefore comes down to a procedural point and it would appear from the information available to the MIIT, that the review committee properly abided by the rules that were then in force.
2. ITO Exam Cheating, Bribery and Manipulation

Officials alleged that there was widespread cheating on R&J exams. Courses for both R&Js and ITOs were sat simultaneously during the main competition. Several R&Js reported to AIBA senior personnel that the exam results were not a true reflection of the abilities of some R&Js and that the results did not coincide with the pass and fail marks. Supporting this was information from AIBA senior management that some of the results had changed from fail to pass overnight, without any real explanation as to how and why.

Intelligence available to the MIIT reveals that the two ITOs, who were R&J evaluators, were instructing in the R&J training course had previously extorted money and valuable gifts from officials during previous exams taken in Kazakhstan and Russia, in return for passing grades. The MIIT has not been able to confirm these allegations, however, there may have been a similar problem during the Dubai R&J course.

One of the ITOs had already been selected to complete part of the ITO course himself while in Dubai in order to complete his accreditation while at the same time teaching the R&J course. Ironically he was caught cheating on his own ITO exam by the course supervisor. However he was not officially reprimanded and was allowed to re-take the exam.

One of the R&Js accused of alleged corruption in Dubai appeared on the appointments list as recently as the October 21 World Boxing Championships in Belgrade. He was, however, removed by AIBA before officiating, following due diligence research, artificial intelligence integrity risk analysis and subsequent interviews conducted by members of the MIIT, which identified this individual as being of significant high-risk for corruption.
The IOC was particularly interested in this tournament and requested that the MIIT conduct a review. There were no direct allegations of corruption reported to the MIIT. Nonetheless, we identified procedural weaknesses that should be addressed to prevent allegations of corruption in the future, specifically concerning the role of the TD. During the event a bout review was requested on a specific bout. The MIIT’s evidence indicates that the TD became involved in trying to influence the decision of this bout, stating to the bout reviewers that if the decision was reversed, it would be “bad for boxing”. The MIIT has identified the TD as a high-risk official for corruption.

The presence of the TD to ensure the bout is properly reviewed falls into the responsibilities of the position. However, the TD should not be able to give an opinion or try to influence the decision of the observer and R&J evaluators who are charged with that function. Of additional concern is the fact that the TD is the same official about which historical and more recent concerns over bout manipulation have been raised.

Members of the MIIT attended Belgrade tasked with conducting a screening process of the appointed R&Js and ITOs following a pre-tournament vetting process. The objective was to identify those officials that posed a high-risk of corruption and give AIBA the opportunity to take remedial action proactively before the start of the event. The results of this pilot project have been reported separately in the following chapter. See the Belgrade Chapter 6.

The MIIT has included this tournament here to show the dichotomy between the R&J sentiments related to past competitions and their experience at Belgrade. The MIIT received unsolicited emails from several of the appointed R&Js at the close of the event. It is clear from those comments received that the MIIT’s attendance and the processes it conducted had a positive effect on reducing the likelihood of bout manipulation. Some of the comments included:
“It was incredible to work without the external pressures and intimidation I’ve been accustomed to…. I believe that this will be an ongoing process, but true reform is already taking place!”

“The AIBA Men’s c[hampion]ships was amazing. Going forward, it’s very good to know that should anyone have concerns that there’s a process in place where individuals can feel confident to speak up. As the saying goes - ‘See something, Hear something - Say something’.”

Despite the attendance by the MIIT at Belgrade, the MIIT still has concerns that external groups were trying to intimidate or coerce certain R&Js and ITOs both to manipulate bouts themselves and to get other officials to support them. There was both insufficient time and detail to investigate these matters at the event itself, however the intelligence obtained is under review and the MIIT has forwarded to AIBA confidentially, individuals suspected of being involved in corrupt activities to be monitored during future competitions.

4.4 Conclusion

The watershed moment that occurred in Rio did little to curb ongoing manipulation. In the years that followed, the corruption remained, less orchestrated, but built on the experience of Rio. The removal of the 5 star cadre of corrupt officials and the Executive Director created a vacuum which was filled by new cliques of common language factions of officials intent on manipulating the outcome of bouts, either directly or through the intimidation and/or coercion of other susceptible officials. It is unclear whether members of this group historically interacted with the 5 stars, or whether upon their demise, they saw a gap in the market that could be filled by another cadre of corrupt officials. The above analysis demonstrates that similar attempts to manipulate bouts have continued unabated to the present day. Going forward, given the new structure of prize money for medallists, it will be increasingly important for AIBA to implement systems, such as the pre-vetting system conducted by the MIIT at Belgrade, to curb and dissuade attempts at corruption and manipulation.
With time having passed since some of the reported incidents occurred, there appears little merit in commencing fresh investigations into these historical events. Instead, it is recommended that a line is drawn in the sand, starting with the recent World Boxing Championships in Belgrade 2021. Going forward, new cases of alleged corruption should be efficiently and expeditiously investigated, using all the skills and tools available to AIBA, including where pertinent, the review of historical evidence to support the investigation findings.
Chapter 5: Disciplinary Commission of AIBA 2013 to 2021 Analysis of Corruption Matters

5.1 Introduction

The MIIT undertook a review of AIBA’s disciplinary files to understand the process and decision making from when a complaint alleging manipulation or corruption is first filed to when disciplinary action is taken. A number of the MIIT’s witnesses described that often complaints would be filed, but no follow up action would be taken or complaints that appear to have had substantive evidence never made it to the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”) for review and decision. The MIIT requested from AIBA’s temporary integrity officer the file of disciplinary cases from 2013 to present, which it received. These files were reviewed and summarised. This summary is attached as an exhibit.

While the summary discusses all forms of disciplinary cases, this chapter focuses only on the cases that alleged manipulation or corruption. This process has revealed several flaws in the process and procedures used by the DC. In reply to the enquiry of the MIIT, internal counsel had this to say about the fact that complaints from R&Js did not seem to go anywhere:

“Based on my experience in disciplinary proceeding, I am still sure that the statements from R&J were not detailed enough and there was not enough to apply to the Disciplinary Committee for provisional suspension. First, such a decision requires sufficiently serious evidence, which was not available. Secondly, any hasty decision could harm the further course of the investigation. At that time we did not have resources to investigate the case on a proper level.”15

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15 AIBA728a - RE Case Finalisation Records - Yury Zaytsev email.
These comments are borne out in the analysis that follows. The MIIT provides recommendations how to ameliorate it going forward.

5.2 Summary and Analysis of AIBA Disciplinary Code Complaints 2013-2019


The first case involved Andy Griffiths, a member Welsh Amateur Boxing Association (“WABA”). On 23 July 2013 Griffiths alleged money laundering was occurring within the WABA. He made his complaint known to the press and others outside of AIBA, such as members of UK Parliament. The AIBA Executive Committee (“EC”) sent the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”).\footnote{This procedure changed in 2021 to have the Integrity Officer bringing the complaint not the EC.}

At some point in the deliberations of the EC, they alleged that Griffith’s had violated Article 6.4 Disparagement of AIBA’s reputation & interests (inaccurate, libellous allegations) and the process turned into a case against the complainant for breach of D Code and the original complaint of money laundering was not addressed. In essence the complaint was turned into an attack on the complainant.

It was not until four years later in June 2017 that a manipulation complaint was lodged and investigated by the Draw Commissioner (Luiz Boselli) regarding crowd control in the African Continental Boxing Championships during 17-25 June 2017. The impetus for the crowd “riot” was the contentious decision of a bout between Morocco and Congo. In the original decision, the Moroccan had won. After the event, the AIBA supervisor informed the African Boxing Confederation President Bayor and Congolese Boxing Federation’s members that the decision would be changed and the Congo boxer determined the winner. This was done to appease the crowd but was in violation of Competition and Technical Rules. The DC Decision called for reversal, to show the original (contentious) decision of the Moroccan boxer as the winner.\footnote{The decision also says that other officials who reviewed the bout believed the Moroccan did lose the bout.} The impetus for the crowd riot exhibited signs of match-manipulation, but this was not properly
investigated or addressed nor was it considered for further action in the DC decision. The decision was made without a hearing and based only on documentary evidence. Ultimately the underlying issue concerned bout manipulation, but it was not investigated nor did the DC address it. The disciplinary action imposed required a letter of apology and 500 CHF fine borne by each R&J official. President Bayor was disciplined for instigating the crowd riot and immediately suspended from all boxing activities, duties and responsibilities for a period of three years and fined 10,000 CHF.

The third case sent to the DC stemmed from the European Under 22 Championships in April 2018. The complaint was lodged on 5 April 2018. Franco Falcinelli on behalf of the European Boxing Confederation (“EUBC”) requested DC to review the report of the tournament’s Technical Director, Marko Marovic who alleged that for multiple bouts the Russian coach Kravtsov used inappropriate behavior (verbal assaults, refusal to leave ring) to protest bouts. Tom Virgets, the Executive Director at the time, reviewed Marovic’s TD report and submitted a brief to the DC. In his response, Kravtsov alleges that match-fixing was the reason for his behaviour and accuses the Romanian and Belarussian teams of match-fixing. Kravtsov was suspended nine months for his behaviour and fined 2,500 CHF. The DC did not follow up on Kravtsov’s statement of match-fixing. Once again, the minor complaint was dealt with, but there was no follow-up on the more serious allegations of match-fixing that were raised.

The next example concerns former AIBA EC member Steve Ninvalle. He is alleged to have breached Article 6.4 Disparagement of AIBA’s reputation and interests, Article 6.11 Violation of the Principles of Conduct, and violation of the AIBA Certificate of Compliance when he expressed discontent with judging appointments and disparaged Americas Boxing Confederation appointed representatives. On 12 July 2018 the EC provisionally suspended him. On 9 October 2018 the DC issued a reprimand and lifted the Provisional Suspension. The DC however did not follow up on his initial complaint against the appointments of R&Js.
The MIIT reviewed the files for five additional cases sent to the DC but did not include them in this analysis because they are not applicable to bout manipulation. Additionally, the decision of the DC was not in the files provided. Three cases related to the internal challenge regarding the President of AIBA, another related to a process requirement related to payment of membership fees and the last related to the eligibility of EC members.

5.3 Illustration of DC Dismissing a Matter Without Full Investigation

As described in Chapter 4, two R&Js complained about potential manipulation by the tournament’s Deputy Supervisor (“DS”). They alleged that R&Js were pressured by the DS to manipulate bout results by scoring in favour of certain countries.

The outcomes of this case illustrate that there continued to be flaws in terms of the disciplinary process that is followed. The two R&Js complained to the Supervisor of the tournament Ray Silvas, who brought it to the attention of the Disciplinary Committee. They prepared written statements stating they were subjected to the pressure. Ray Silvas, Supervisor and member of SIC, led an internal ad hoc review of the allegations. The outcome of the investigation resulted in the DS being removed from the tournament and his accreditation revoked. However, he asked to remain on-site which was granted, providing the reason that he was responsible for the wellbeing of a boxer with the same nationality whose coach was no longer able to attend. It is in the MIIT’s view that a zero tolerance approach should have been taken and the DS sent home immediately.

Subsequent to the ad hoc investigation on-site, the Supervisor recommended that the investigation report be submitted to the Executive Director and for the AIBA Legal Department to prepare a formal complaint to be submitted to the DC. Despite the fact that the internal legal counsel reviewed and advised that there was “sufficient elements to submit the case to the

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18 Case 5 relates to an alleged overthrow of President with complaints against Franco Falcinelli et al (interim management committee) while case 6 relates to internal fighting regarding the President.
The MIIT finds that it was unacceptable that AIBA staff enabled the DS to remain at the tournament despite the resulting conflict of interest of his assisting a boxer from his own NF. AIBA officials succumbed to his request to remain at the tournament, where his ability to influence the outcome of bouts through contact with corrupted R&Js was a real threat. The disciplinary process should have contained the risk to other boxers and R&Js. This carelessness potentially put the integrity of the entire tournament at risk. As stated in Chapter 4, but bears repeating here, the MIIT recommends that any infraction of the FOP rules and procedures would therefore result, under a zero tolerance approach, in the official’s immediate removal from the venue and hotel, accreditation revoked, and put on the first flight available to their home jurisdiction while they await any further disciplinary action or investigation.

5.4 Summary and Analysis of AIBA Disciplinary Code Complaints 2021

On 13 December 2020 the new AIBA Constitution came into effect and replaced AIBA statutes. The changes included:

- Bylaws were now “AIBA Regulations”
- Statutes were now “AIBA Constitution” no new Director can become an official at competition
- Disciplinary Commission now “Disciplinary Committee”

In addition to the new Constitution, on 8 April 2021 new AIBA Procedural Rules based on Art. 47.1 new Constitution came into effect. The new procedural rules replaced the Organisational and Procedural Rules of Judicial Authorities AIBA and instituted a temporary AIBA Integrity Officer. Currently that role is filled by AIBA’s external legal counsel until the permanent appointment of the Integrity Officer. This solves in part a past weakness of the previous Code.
Whilst a welcome move, it is evident that a lack of time and investigative resources continues to be a hindrance to this process and should be reinforced.

Since the new Constitution has been in effect, there have been three complaints lodged with the external counsel acting as the temporary Integrity Officer. One case was completed in December of 2020 and the other two cases are not completed and still in process. The temporary Integrity Officer’s explanation is because his time is so limited he has not had chance to complete the matters.

5.5 Conclusion

Before the 2021 reforms, the DC had no investigation process and no resources to conduct investigations. If it could not get responses from potential witnesses or other information, it dismissed the case based on the fact that the burden of proof had not been met. This seems to be the biggest defect of the prior system. This has been corrected by the new Constitution and the temporary Integrity Officer, as noted above it is currently being filled by AIBA’s external legal team. A new integrity office will be established in the second quarter of 2022. This body, if it has the resources, would be both investigator and prosecutor with DC acting as judge of the evidence produced.

While the MIIT was on-site during the World Boxing Championships in Belgrade earlier this year, the comments frequently heard in interviews were that complaints went nowhere. For that reason, individuals with legitimate complaints rarely came forward and instead feared that if they did complain, it would be used against them at some point in the future.

Although the DC had significant flaws, the process to file a complaint was not one of them. In the past, without an independent office to receive a complaint, the complaint would proceed to an AIBA official, usually the Executive Director and go nowhere after that. Then the procedure would require a report to the EC and a vote of the EC to send the matter to the DC. It was the
recipients of complaint that stopped the process from ever commencing at the DC via a vote of the EC. In some cases, the recipient might well have been making a judgment call that there was insufficient evidence. In the case of R&Js complaints concerning bout manipulation, the temporary Integrity Officer made the point to the MIIT that little in the way of evidence would be forthcoming from the complainant.

The MIIT is well aware of how hard it is to make a case that a bout has been manipulated. The advent of the Integrity Officer presuming that person acts with proper dispatch and legal effect would solve the concerns of R&Js and ITOs that complaints go nowhere so do not make them. Also, in the complaints that did make it to the DC there was a lack of interest in investigating and obtaining the evidence necessary to analyse and establish a complaint. The excuse that the evidence did not meet the burden of proof was a favoured response. That lack of interest may well have had a financial component in that there was no budget to investigate complaints. Therefore, the fashion in which they failed to do any investigative work contributed to the attitude that complaints went nowhere. Alternatively, the person making the complaint on occasion was turned into the subject matter of the discipline rather than investigating what the complaint was about and the root cause of what was going on.

For the reasons set out above, the DC work was of an unsatisfactory and incomplete process resulting in ineffective protection of the organisation by its role. Note the hiatus in cases between 2013 and 2017. By this latter date when cases picked up it was not to do with manipulation of bouts but more about the process of eligibility or electing officials to the EC.

In summary, a lack of financial resources, expertise to run a disciplinary hearing and no investigative capacity meant that the DC in performing its tasks could not protect AIBA as an institution. Its role was ineffective and in need of significant reforms now on the way in the form of an Independent Integrity Officer and Independent Investigation Unit.
Chapter 6: Risk Assessment at the 2021 Boxing World Championships in Belgrade, Serbia

6.1 Introduction

It was clear to the MIIT from the beginning of its engagement that AIBA had a strong appetite to progress and evolve past the unfortunate reputation that it had been left with after years of corruption. Indeed AIBA’s appointment of the Haas Commission and the MIIT demonstrates their desire to start a new chapter. The ideal opportunity to start writing it arose with AIBA’s premier calendar event, the Men’s World Boxing Championships. At the suggestion of McLaren Global Sport Solutions and at the invitation of AIBA, the McLaren Independent Inquiry Team (“MIIT”) was present at the 2021 AIBA World Boxing Championships in Belgrade, Serbia (“Belgrade”) from 24 October to 6 November 2021. At Belgrade, the MIIT tested, through a pilot project, the effectiveness and use of a newly developed artificial intelligence tool which evaluates an integrity risk assessment of individuals. In this case, the software tool designated the name ‘Challenger’ was applied to the Referee & Judges (“R&J”) and International Technical Officials (“ITO”) invited to participate at the tournament and identified those R&Js and ITOs who were considered a high-risk to perform in their role at the Championships.

Through the MIIT’s interviews and evidence gathering, it recognised that the ideal path forward for AIBA is to use a three-pronged approach – protect, detect, and prevent. First, the necessity to protect was recognised through the many officials that fear retribution or being penalised for not succumbing to the pressure or coercion exerted on them. Key to AIBA’s progress is the protection to those individuals who are not tempted to manipulate bouts at major Championships and other events. Thus, the MIIT’s screening process provided the incorruptible officials with a blanket of protection that there wouldn’t be the same intimidation seen at previous events. Secondly, the detection and prevention prongs function to identify and eliminate potential corruptors who may manipulate bout scores and outcomes of bouts or threaten and intimidate others into doing so. The MIIT has had the full support of AIBA in implementing and actioning these measures in the vetting of their officials. The measures
implemented by the MIIT on behalf of AIBA are unprecedented in the history of the sport of boxing. The MIIT is committed to carrying out a similar project at the postponed 2021 AIBA Women’s World Boxing Championships in 2022 at Istanbul, Turkey.

6.2 The Three Step Vetting Process

In the weeks leading up to Belgrade, AIBA supplied the MIIT with the names of 50 R&Js and 25 ITOs who would be at a two-day training session prior to the opening of the Championships and from which AIBA would choose its final roster of officials. The first step in the pilot process involved vetting using the cyber investigation platform “Seeker”, which is available in house to the MIIT. This platform researches and identifies officials who might have any issues in their antecedents or history that may impact on their suitability to officiate in Belgrade. This may include their past or current relationships or behaviours amongst numerous other parameters. Former law enforcement analysts from the MIIT conducted the vetting procedures using this platform to interpret and report the data. The results of that process was that two (2) individuals were identified as being of suitably high-risk. One official had been previously suspended by the National Federation and this was not communicated to AIBA; while in relation to the other official there was evidence that indicated cheating on an AIBA exam. Recommendations were made to AIBA to reject them from the available pool of officials at the Championships. Both were removed from AIBA’s proposed appointments list.

The second step in the process was conducted on-site at the official AIBA hotel which housed the R&Js and ITOs for the duration of the Championships. The vetting process during phase two utilised the Challenger Voice Analytics Tool which triaged the R&Js and ITOs into several integrity risk categories ranging from low to high-risk.

The technology uses pertinent questions\(^\text{19}\) and the methodology of question development is fundamental to the success of the technology. In this instance the questions were crafted by

\(^{19}\) An example: Do you know of any AIBA official who has cheated in a competition in the last five years?
AIBA, MIIT and AI experts to be applicable for a boxing official interviewee, to specifically measure the individual’s integrity risk regarding certain events of manipulation/corruption. In addition, in order to eliminate human bias, the questionnaire was recorded in seven languages. This emerging technology developed by the company Clearspeed Inc. is being used to undertake background and vetting checks on a wide range of industries such as insurance personnel and now sport, with boxing as the first sport piloted.

The AI technology works by having the participant interviewee call via telephone into an automated questionnaire loaded with the specially crafted questions. The technology captures vocal responses to the automated questions, creates an integrated model of each response, and then evaluates them from low-risk to high-risk. There is no “baseline” required for each voice questionnaire. The AI voice analytics software analyses each response for the cognitive functions of the brain required to answer the question. The presence (or absence) of vocal signatures indicative of distinctive risk-associated reactions is detected and evaluated. The analytical technology detects and evaluates the recorded responses through an individual’s vocal structures and features of voice. This process is based upon established cognitive neuroscience evidenced by international research experts and supported by global organisations. This is the proprietary AI aspect of the technology.

The result of the analysis attributes each response a risk score from low-risk to high-risk or “admission” (i.e. the participant admitted a detail asked by the question). The system then produces a custom report with overall risk ratings allowing experts, like the investigation team of the MIIT, to clear people quickly, while also identifying potential corruption and risk that might otherwise have gone undetected. These risk results enabled the MIIT to focus resources on those participants who fall into the high-risk category, or those who have knowledge of others posing potential risk. As such, it is an invaluable investigative tool in develop leads to investigate. It is important to note that the process does not measure malfeasance or whether the participant is being deceitful. It is not lie detection. The technology is unique and does not make absolute
determinations of truth or deception. There may be valid reasons (other than the participant purposely responding inaccurately) why responses are flagged as higher risk.

All high-risk results and admissions triggered additional evaluation and follow-up interviews by the MIIT with the individuals concerned. These interviews are vital to the process. They provide an opportunity, in cases of admission for the individual to describe in detail the circumstances of their admission and in cases of high-risk, the interviewee could possibly mitigate reasons why the system triaged their answer as high-risk. The nature of each individual’s risk profile and the specific context of any risk flags must be determined before appropriate action can be taken. All data points, including follow-up interviews, vetting and already held intelligence were evaluated in making consistent and considered decisions. Those assessed as remaining at high-risk after an interview were rerecommended to not be deployed to participate in the Belgrade event and possibly future Championships. Following this process, AIBA officials decided to exclude two individuals from officiating at Belgrade.

The final step in the process involved randomly selecting individuals in the last two days of the Championships to undertake a further automated test utilising a different question set concentrating on their activities aligned to the Championships. Seven participants returned an overall high-risk score and were subsequently interviewed by the MIIT. Five participants were able to explain or mitigate their high-risk reactions to the satisfaction of the MIIT. Two remained at high-risk. The MIIT made recommendations to AIBA that they should not officiate at the final rounds of the Championships.

6.3 Conclusion

The overall results of the pilot project were a significant success. The MIIT achieved what it had set out to do – to protect, to detect, to prevent. It helped protect incorruptible officials from the intimidation and coercion of the past; in its pre vetting it detected high-risk officials who, as a result, were not included in the pool of potential participants at Belgrade; and it prevented high-risk potential corruptors from manipulating bout scores and outcomes of bouts or threaten and
intimidate others from participating at Belgrade. A total of six officials were prevented from participating through this background vetting process. Indeed, several R&Js reported to the MIIT that they never have been at a Championships where they felt as secure and supported by AIBA in not having their roles influenced by those wishing to manipulate bouts. Furthermore, it was well received by AIBA. For the MIIT, its on-site activities resulted in gathering rich intelligence that prompted it to look at other competitions where witnesses alleged corruption and manipulation. This has been discussed above in Chapter 4. These efforts to protect, detect, and prevent match-manipulation will continue at the rescheduled Women’s World Championships in Istanbul, Turkey. The totality of the reform efforts being implemented by AIBA, including this proprietary AI technology, sends a strong signal to all officials in the AIBA boxing community that corruption will be weeded out, and ethical R&Js and ITO will be supported.
Chapter 7: Recommendations

The purpose of this chapter is to consolidate all of the MIIT’s recommendations found throughout this Report. Our findings for this recommendations section arise from both Stage 1 and Stage 3 Reports.

RECOMMENDATION ONE – INDEPENDENT INTEGRITY UNITY

The MIIT supports and reinforces by this investigation the recommendation the Governance Reform Group led by Professor Haas which recommended the formation of an Independent Integrity Unit. The MIIT’s investigation has revealed the historical lack of trust not only between AIBA management and its R&J stakeholders, but within and between R&Js themselves. The emergence of authoritarian factions of language-based cliques have raised fears among the R&Js that noncompliance with their requests to score bouts based on pre-determined results would run a double risk of retaliation from both management and the internal cliques. Therefore, it is imperative that AIBA staff, volunteers, R&Js, ITOs and members have access to a safe, secure and independent office to raise their concerns and complaints. The following are more specific recommendations to aid in the formation of the Independent Integrity Unit.

i. Independent Integrity Unit (“IIU”) to have its own staff and budget under the control of a Chief Integrity Officer.

ii. IIU to be the single point of contact to receive complaints, investigate and where required refer to Disciplinary Committee (“DC”). Where IIU provides the evidence it has to DC, it will prosecute the referral case.

iii. IIU to investigate complaints and where appropriate send case to Disciplinary Committee (“DC”).

iv. The IIU to have a separate position dedicated to prosecution of matters before the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”).

v. IIU to vet all R&Js and ITOs proposing to attend AIBA level competitions. Vetting process to include:
   a. IIU vetting conducted pre-arrival to competition;
b. Administration of on-site Challenger Artificial Intelligence ("AI") integrity risk screening of individual officials;
c. Follow up interviews post AI analysis; and,
d. Report to Secretary General ("SG") & R&J Chair on persons assessed to be high-risk (SG makes final decision on continued participation).

vi. IIU on site at AIBA level competitions to perform an independent observer role over the FOP and the actions and role of R&Js, ITOs, their committee chairs, the Draw Commissioner, Technical Delegate, and Bout Evaluator.

vii. Independent Observer Report to be given by IIU to the AIBA President and Secretary General.

viii. IIU to provide an on-site investigation service with right to zero tolerance for breaches of rules and procedures of the FOP.

ix. All of the above recommendations should be applied to Confederation level Championships.

x. IIU to vet candidates for elected positions with recommendations to the Nominating Committee for those not meeting eligibility requirements to run for election.

xi. IIU to vet all new hires for AIBA senior staff in consideration for an appointment with report to human resources or the Secretary General.

xii. All permanent staff who voluntarily or involuntarily leave AIBA to have an exit interview with the IIU.

xiii. IIU in charge of the stored institutional memory and intelligence information gathered in its own secured database in the course of the operation of the IIU.

xiv. IIU to provide an oversight role in reviewing and recommending changes to the Anti-Doping control procedures.

xv. IIU to provide an oversight role on match-fixing for gambling related reasons.

xvi. A combined International, National and Confederation Task Force be called to determine if a complaint and investigation process similar to what is being recommend for AIBA is suitable to apply at the Confederation and National levels below AIBA.

xvii. IIU to evaluate the strength and credibility of information received.
RECOMMENDATION TWO – WHISTLEBLOWER

AIBA currently operates a Whistleblower line, which is not used probably because of lack of trust of the organisation. The MIIT recommends that the Whistleblower line be moved to the control of the IIU. Until very recently with the inaugural year of the temporary Integrity Officer, there was not a centralised office where AIBA stakeholders could report complaints. Some individuals complained to AIBA staff who would do nothing with the complaint or make an assessment of evidence and then still refrain from taking action. Others went to the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”) who had no budget or investigative capacity.

The DC had no authority to compel compliance with their queries. If individuals the DC requested to interview refused to cooperate or if they provided no information then the DC dismissed the complaint for insufficient evidence often stating the burden of proof was not met. Moreover, there was no official process that would be followed when a complaint was received. However, the MIIT noticed a lifting of tension and distress while it was on-site during the AIBA World Boxing Championships at Belgrade and several officials thanked the MIIT for being available to make confidential disclosures. The following are the specific recommendations in relation to the establishment of a trusted and effective Whistleblower line.

i. Whistleblower hotline to be independently maintained and managed by the IIU to build confidence in trust and confidentiality.

ii. IIU to evaluate the strength and credibility of information received.

iii. Whistleblower protection policy to be reviewed and revised in accordance with these recommendations.

iv. A recognised position on the Board to champion whistleblowers demonstrating a top down interest in whistleblowing. Also to ensure that whistleblowers are protected from retaliation.
RECOMMENDATION THREE – INTEGRITY OF AIBA INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

The MIIT recommends independent background vetting by IIU of all elected positions, competition officials and senior staff new hires. The process by which this would be done, utilising risk analysis techniques which measure voice responses to automated questions, was tested and found to be successful at the World Boxing Championships at Belgrade earlier this year. The MIIT recommends the following additional measures to complement the artificial intelligence process.

Specific to elected positions:

i. No one to be elected and re-elected for more than two full terms.

ii. Consider age limitation on elected officials at age 80 (as per the IOC standard).

iii. AIBA elected officials cannot enter the FOP, meaning they also cannot hold an ITO position because the position requires presence on the FOP.

iv. Executive Committee Members cannot have a role paid or unpaid, with any company sponsoring AIBA.

Applied to all positions:

v. Full disclosure of outside business interests and a ban on links to sponsorship companies or any organisation presenting a conflict with their role at AIBA. This to be applied to elected and appointed officials and staff.

vi. Establishment of a gift register for elected competition officials and members of staff to be reviewed by the IIU.

vii. Gift Policy to be reviewed and revised in accordance with these recommendations.

viii. Enable mobile phones/electronic devices and laptops to be copied by the AIBA IIU should it be required in the course of an investigation.\(^20\)

ix. Maintain an intelligence database of all incidents and disciplinary actions to ensure ongoing corporate memory of any problem. This extends beyond the officials to those that seek to influence them in anyway.

\(^20\) At Belgrade the MIIT had examples of improper messages being circulated and capturing this in evidence is important part of any disciplinary process.
x. Be proactive in screening for integrity threats to officials and take pre-emptive action.

RECOMMENDATION FOUR – EDUCATION

The MIIT recommends that AIBA develop an integrity education programme. This would include consistent communication to officials of the integrity processes and requirements described in these recommendations. Of key importance is to develop a communication and educational strategy which is deployed prior to the start of each competition, reviewing what is and is not acceptable behaviour. For example, the MIIT found evidence of alliances between officials from countries speaking the same language supporting each other in bout manipulation. Education should cover:

i. Meaning of the zero tolerance policy and consequences of its violation.

ii. What is deemed a bribe and how to deal with offers.

iii. Explain what actions they should take if they receive unsolicited messages from outside people or through electronic means to influence an event.

iv. Explain how the integrity measures are designed to help them protect themselves.

v. Explain the use of the Whistleblower line and how to report to the IIU.

vi. Explain the functions of the IIU.

vii. One half of the Executive Committee Board Members to be required to attend recognised corporate governance training session every second year. Failure to attend results in a suspension until attendance is confirmed.

viii. R&Js, ITOs and other personnel on the FOP to have bi-annual integrity training sessions. To retain their status they must successfully pass any tests administered during or at the end of the training.

ix. Assist competition officials in understanding the measures needed to protect themselves from outside or internal illicit influence.

x. Bout review training to be undertaken annually for R&J evaluators and independent observers.
xi. Review and revise the exam administration process and procedures and consider it in the course of developing the curriculum. Particular attention paid to the administration of testing and the evaluation of the test results to stop the cheating.

RECOMMENDATION FIVE – DISCIPLINARY PROCESS

Only a limited number of disciplinary cases have been launched and dealt with between 2014 and the present. This stunning paucity of cases during this time despite the complaints heard reveals that the disciplinary process is in dire need of an overhaul. The MIIT accepts that, in part, justification for this was that there was no budget, investigative capacity or capabilities. Investigations amounted to asking questions by email and accepting at face value the response given. Then concluding that there was insufficient evidence or that burden of proof had not been met resulting in the complaint being dismissed. There was also a perceived lack of appetite to pursue any investigation by management who received complaints and then did nothing with it. The MIIT recommends:

i. The IIU provides the increased investigation and prosecution capacity.

ii. Review and revise the Codes of Conduct and Ethics policies to capture the breaches of the unacceptable behaviours described in this Report and make breaches easier to investigate prosecute and sanction.

iii. Disciplinary actions to be clearly defined and enforced.

iv. Review and revise the Code of Conduct to enable to the capture of intelligence and evidence from electronic storage and digital communication devices.

v. IIU to have ability to independently launch an investigation without a complaint and based on the intelligence gathered in the course of its operations.

vi. IIU to have separate office to prosecute cases before the DC.

vii. Introduction of clear structure of sanctions alongside increased tariffs for second offences.
viii. Any ban to be strictly enforced. No contact at all to be allowed with a banned individual. Contact with a banned person to be made an offence.

RECOMMENDATION SIX – RIGOURS ENFORCEMENT OF ROLES OF INDIVIDUALS IN FOP

The judging of bouts in boxing is one of the most subjective assessments made in any Olympic sport. Judging in boxing is without objective criteria other than a boxer being unable to continue the bout because of knock out, or TKO. In such an environment, where most of the corrupt manoeuvring is undertaken surreptitiously, catching someone red handed while in the process of cheating or conspiring to manipulate a bout is virtually impossible to achieve. That being the case, the only method of control and oversight is by rigorous enforcement of the FOP rules and the activities in which they can engage while in the FOP. Some officials at Belgrade did not conform with the rules and perhaps lacked full understanding thereof to carry out the roles they were assigned. Protection against bout manipulation is best achieved in a sport that is very subjective in its judging by rigorous enforcement of their role. The MIIT recommends:

i. Greater education for officials to understand their role and FOP rules is required.

ii. Discipline should follow from any breaches of the FOP rules without exception.

iii. No mobile phones or other form of digital communication allowed on the FOP by competition officials unless specific need for contact related to the competition.


v. Officials’ lounges must be secure and access by unauthorised personnel or visitors prohibited.

vi. Immediate investigation of offences reported and zero tolerance applied to breaches.

vii. Measures to be applied at International, Continental and Youth Championships.
Exhibit 1
1.0 Disciplinary Archive Summary

Historical Archive – AIBA Discipline 2014-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIBA Parties</th>
<th>Summary &amp; Chronology of Proceedings</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Andy Griffiths, Member Welsh Amateur Boxing Association General Council, 2013 | - Griffiths alleged violations within Welsh Amateur Boxing Assoc. (money laundering).
   - Allegations began in July 2013 with email from Griffiths to WABA (AIBA and others copied).
   - Griffiths subject to DC of AIBA (Articles 2.1(b-d) and (e).
   - On 9 August, the AIBA EC voted to file a complaint to the DC. (Note: this procedure |
- Alleged to have violated Article 6.4 Disparagement of AIBA’s reputation & interests (inaccurate, libellous allegations) in A Brief to the Disciplinary Commission.
2. 16 August 2013 brief requested AIBA Disciplinary Commission to take action against Griffiths.
3. 26 August 2013, Disciplinary Investigation initiated by DC Chair.
4. 30 August 2013 complaint and Brief served on Griffiths (no response).
5. 25 September second notice of complaint and Brief (no response).
6. On 5 October 2013, Disciplinary Procedure Decision: sanction imposed by DC Chair: 3-month suspension, and CHF 3000 fine, 500 costs.
7. 8 April 2019 letter to Griffiths from Chairman AIBA DC advising continued suspension as fines not paid.
8. 15 April 2019 letter to Griffiths from Chairman AIBA DC, reaffirming the process.

Continental Boxing Championships – Congo, 17-25 June 2017 - Federation Congolaise de Boxe (Fecoboxe)

- Disciplinary actions initiated by AIBA re. crowd control incidents pursuant to Article 4.6 of AIBA Disciplinary Code.
1. 25 June 2017 Report from Draw Commissioner (Luiz Boselli) to AIBA Sports Director. Recommends Mr. Bayor AFBC President and Mr. Richard Mouambouma, Congo Federation President to AIBA Disciplinary Commission.
2. Complaint from AIBA Legal Department to AIBA Disciplinary Commission (not located in file).
3. 7 July 2017 Letter to Richard Mouambouma, President Fecoboxe informing disciplinary proceedings from AIBA DC Chair.
4. 7 July 2017 Letter to Kelani Bayor, AFBC President informing disciplinary proceedings.

has since been replaced with complaints to be brought by Integrity Officer).
- On 16 August, AIBA Legal Department prepared/submitted the Brief to the Disciplinary Commission.
- 5 October 2013 Decision final, not subject to appeal.
- Griffiths did not request reconsideration of decision within 30 days pursuant to AIBA procedural rules.
- Unclear as to why 6 years passed before Griffiths revisited this?

- Proceedings according to (old) Organization and Procedural Rules of the Judicial Authorities of AIBA.
- Confidentiality promised in 7 July letter to ITOs and R&J’s.
- Exhibit 1 includes statements from ITO’s and R&J’s. Note: 14 statements are summarized.
- Exhibit and statements are not dated.
- No responses for additional information were provided by Bayor or Mouambouma.
- No oral hearing (based on extensive documentary evidence).
- Ruling made on documentary evidence.
5. 7 July 2017 Letter to ITOs and R&Js assigned to Continental Boxing Championships. Request for statements in response to crowd control issues in Boselli Report.
6. 25 July 2017 Letter to Bayor providing copy of ITO/R&J statements. Request for any response on or before 4 August.
8. 1 September 2017 Decision of Disciplinary Panel issued. Fecobox found liable for the order and security inside and around the venue; 2 years suspension from organizing an AIBA competition; various financial penalties.

- Ruling called for letter of apology and CHF 500 compensation to each official.
- Nothing in file as to if/when these sanctions were completed.
- The impetus for the crowd “riot” was the decision. Original decision had Moroccan as winner. After the event, the AIBA supervisor Boselli informed Bayor and Fecobox members that the decision would be changed and Congo determined the winner – done to appease crowd but in violation of Competition and Technical Rules. DC Decision called for reversal, to show original (contentious) decision of Moroccan as winner (Note: decision also says that other officials who reviewed the bout believed the Moroccan did lose the bout.)
- The impetus for the crowd riot exhibited signs of match-manipulation, but this was not properly investigated or addressed for further action in the DC Decision (as far as I can see).

Edward Kravtsov, RusBoxing, 2018
- Allegation: for multiple bouts Kravtsov used inappropriate behaviour (verbal assaults, refusal to leave ring) to protest bouts, accusation of match-fixing: 01/04/2018 Bout #195; 29/03/2018 Bout #190; Bout #251.
- Violations of Article 4.6 of DC (Principles of Responsibility), 6.1 Misconduct towards a competition official; 6.4 Disparagement of AIBA’s Reputation and Interests.

- Additional documentation includes a “Report on incidents with infringements on AIBA rules and Code of Conduct Compiled by EUBC Office representatives” [unsigned, undated; it is unclear if this is in fact the Marovic Report].
1. Report from Technical Director Marko Marovic from EUBC under 22 Championships, April 2018.
2. 05 April 2018 AIBA receives request from Franco Falcinelli, on behalf of EUBC, asking DC to review report of Marko Marovic.
3. 28 April AIBA Executive Director (Tom Virgets), reviewed the Report and submitted complaint (Brief) to Disciplinary Commission.
4. 03 May Letter to Boxing Federation of Russia with copy of complaint (Brief) against Kravtsov and report from Marovic.
   - Kravtsov requested to respond in writing by 17 May.
5. 04 May Letter from Russian Federation to AIBA, detailing disciplinary actions taken against Kravtsov.
6. 08 May Letter from AIBA to Boxing Federation of Russia in response to their 04 May letter.
7. 10 May letter from Kravtsov to AIBA Discipline Commission [contains allegations of match-fixing, as the reason for his behaviour].
8. 14 May 2018 Letter to Franco Falcinelli and Marko Marovic from AIBA with copy of complaint (Brief) and response from Kravtsov.
   - Written responses to Kravtsov’s account requested.
9. (No copy of any response from Falcinelli or Marovic – 5 May - in file).
10. 31 May 2018 Letter to Boxing Federation of Russia requesting additional information about amount of fine levied on Kravtsov.
11. 19 June Decision. Kravtsov suspended from boxing activities for 9 months and fined CHF 2500.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steve Ninvalle, AIBA Executive Committee Member, 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alleged to have breached Article 6.4 Disparagement of AIBA’s reputation and interests, Article 6.11 Violation of the Principles of Conduct, and violation of the AIBA Certificate of Compliance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Delay in providing Brief to Ninvalle who was under provisional suspension due to email address error.

- Kravtsov letter of 10 May should be read in full. Makes allegations of match-fixing and other concerns. Example:
  - Bout #190 MURASHEV Sergei RUS vs. BIRO Alberto-Cristian ROU. “A few days before the start of this Championships received information from one of the members of the Romanian Boxing Federation, that Romanian team is planning to gin up the gold medal in 56 kg and bronze medal in 81 kg…”
  - Bout #251 BATYRGAZIEV Albert RUS vs. ASANAU Dzmitry BLR – additional allegations.

  - Does not appear to be any investigation or follow-up re. the allegations of match-fixing raised by Kravtsov – the root cause of his behaviour.

  - From Decision: “Regarding Bout #190, Mr. Marovic denies that the Local Organizing Committee had any intention to “gin up” certain weight categories in favour of any other team. Mr. Marovic does not know the source of such unsubstantiated and false information.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ninvalle expressed discontent with judging appointments and disparaged AMBC appointed representatives.</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 12 July 2018 Provisional suspension by the AIBA EC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 23 July 2018 AIBA Brief to Disciplinary Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 3 September 2018 Letter and Brief sent to Ninvalle from Barry Jones, AIBA Panel Chairman. Written feedback requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 18 September response from Ninvalle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 9 October 2018 – Decision issued by DC Chair. Decision: Reprimand, provisional suspension lifted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Franco Falcinelli, AIBA Executive VP; + members of the AIBA Interim Management Committee (IMC)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Alleged overthrow of President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Alleged breach of Articles 6.3, 6.4, 6.11 of AIBA Disciplinary Code &amp; Article 8 of the AIBA Code of Ethics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Disciplinary Commission requested to apply Article 10.4 of the Disciplinary Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The adoption and the implementation of the decision with regard to the so-called IMC are breaching AIBA Statutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unlawful suspension of AIBA President and Executive Director.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Alleged collusion with Ho Kim, Karim Bouzidi, Roberto Garea and Patricia Steulet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Violation of trade secrets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IMC intimidation of AIBA staff and interference with AIBA Headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Questionable financing of the IMC, forgery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 26 September 2017 Brief of complaints against Franco Falcinelli et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Franco Falcinelli, AIBA Executive VP, 2018</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Alleged manipulation of EC members re. support for AIBA President candidates. Including false, misleading, and derogatory statements.</td>
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</table>

| **Note:** Refer to Brief of Complaint for detailed description (142 Articles). Additional exhibits provided in hard copy file for reference. |
| IMC defendants: Terry Smith, Alberto Puig De la Barca, Mohamed Moustahsane, Pat Fiacco, Ted Tanner. |
| This case also involves decision of the Swiss Court (finding for the President and Executive Director and that the IMC was never validly constituted). |

<p>| <strong>Note:</strong> Refer to Brief of Complaint for detailed description (36 Articles). |
| 31 August 2018 letter from IOC (Zappelli) to Gafur Rahimov “confirmed that your name...” |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 October 2018</td>
<td>Provisional Suspension ordered by AIBA EC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October 2018</td>
<td>AIBA initiated complaint to DC further to Article 38.1(a) of the AIBA Statutes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2018</td>
<td>Letter and Brief of Complaint sent to Falcinelli. Written feedback requested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 2018</td>
<td>Letter to Falcinelli by DC Chair – confirming ongoing suspension encompassing forthcoming AIBA Congress.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December 2018</td>
<td>Letter to DC Disciplinary Commission Panel from Tom Virgets, AIBA Executive Director, addressing Falcinelli Statement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 2019</td>
<td>AIBA President requested AIBA Ethics Chair to review all AIBA Executive Members (email: “It has come to our attention that some of the EC Members have criminal records and hidden suspicious past. Can you please review all AIBA EC Members eligibility criteria by making deeper research?”).</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Umar Kremlev, AIBA Executive Committee Member, 2019

- Allegation he failed to disclose on Compliance Form that he changed his previous name (from Umar Lutfuloev) under which he had a criminal record.
- Article 35.2 of AIBA statutes states that all candidates must be able to prove that they have never been convicted of a criminal offence.
- Alleged violations of AIBA Statutes (Article 35.2), Code of Ethics (Article 2) and Disciplinary Code (Article 2.1).

- Originated with IOC who was told Kremlev had a criminal record.
- Kremlev, under previous name Lutfuloev, was twice convicted of Racketeering according to Reports.
- Disciplinary Brief signed by AIBA Interim President Dr Mohamad Moustahsane (undated).
- Numerous exhibits: Kremlev signed compliance form, Kremlev passport, request for extensions, correspondence from Kremlev’s Counsel.
2. 16 June 2019 email from Chair of AIBA Ethics Commission to Moustahsane outlining finding that states: “...until now not explained satisfactorily the source or sources of his funds...changed family name...etc.” Mentions information obtained from public (journalistic) sources.

3. 21 June 2019 the AIBA DC received the Brief of Complaint.

4. 3 July 2019 Letter to Kremlev initiating disciplinary proceeding, asking for written response to Brief.

5. 24 July 2019 the AIBA DC received from Counsel for Kremlev a request for extension of time to respond.

6. 15 August 2019 Answers to the Complaint submitted by Kremlev’s attorney.
   - Kremlev denied the Complaint, unsupported by evidence.
   - Kremlev suggests he changed his name not to mask criminal activity, but to avoid religious discrimination

7. 16 August Decision. Complaint dismissed – “The Panel is not competently satisfied that AIBA has met its burden of proof in this matter...”

Volodymyr Prodyvus, AIBA Executive Committee Member, 2019

- Alleged violations of AIBA Statutes (Article 35.2), Code of Ethics (Article 2) and Disciplinary Code (Article 2.1).

1. 12 June 2019 AIBA President requested AIBA Ethics Chair to review all AIBA Executive Members (email: “It has come to our attention that some of the EC Members have criminal records and hidden suspicious past. Can you please review all AIBA EC Members eligibility criteria by making deeper research?”).

2. 16 June 2019 the AIBA Ethics Chair reported to the Interim President information obtained from Wikipedia alleging that Prodyvus served 3 years in a Ukrainian prison camp for car theft and assault with knife; also, involved in illegal amber mining.


- In his reply Brief, Prodyvus provided a Certificate from the Minister of Interior Affairs of Ukraine, certifying that he has not been convicted in criminal cases in Ukraine.

- In his reply Brief, Prodyvus makes a counter claim asking Moustahsane to “clarify who are these IOC representatives who allegedly have made these defamatory allegations...”

- No mention of “IOC representatives” in Discipline Committee complaint – only journalistic sources.

- Decision based on documentary evidence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>Panel provides Complaint and Exhibits to Prodyvus (No letter to Prodyvus located in file).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>Reply Brief from Prodyvus Attorney – denying all claims as false.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>Letter to Moustahsane and Tom Virgets (Executive Director AIBA) from AIBA Disciplinary Panel Chair with copies of Prodyvus Brief and Exhibits – requesting a response in writing (“No Timely Responses were received”).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August</td>
<td>Decision. Complaint dismissed – “The Panel is not competently satisfied that AIBA has met its burden of proof in this matter…”</td>
<td>Counter claim denied in decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August</td>
<td>Decision.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**AIBA vs. Caribbean National Federations, 2020**

- Key issues around payment of fees and the impact on voting at the AIBA Congress.
- Dominican Boxing Federation (DBF) paid the membership fee for 8 federations (Bermuda, Haiti, St. Maarten, Suriname, Virgin Islands, Bahamas, Antigua & Barbuda and Anguilla). Issue is eligibility of these nations to vote at Congress.
- 21 October Inside the Games published an article entitled: “AIBA presidential candidate linked to a possible violation of the electoral rules on the payment of the membership fee.” The article refers to an alleged purchase of votes to favour the candidacy for the presidency of AIBA, Mr. Domingo Solano.
- 13 October report from American Boxing Confederation (AMBC) to AIBA says DBF “indeed asked AMBC to issue the 9 fake receipts…”

1. Numerous letters of concern to AIBA from Caribbean boxing national federations. E.g. 26 October 2020 letter to AIBA Vice President (Bisbal) from Mexico Boxing Federation with summary of alleged violations of DBF including Articles 4 & 10 of AIBA Code of Ethics.
2. 13 October report from American Boxing Confederation to AIBA about unethical behaviour by Dominican Republic Boxing.

- Issues of due process raised (e.g. 29 October letter from Cayman Islands Boxing)
- Multiple letters of concern to AIBA from Caribbean boxing National Federations.
- Allegations of possible influence taking (see 30 October email from Bernhard Welten, Attorney, KanzleiWelten: “…I am of the opinion that the 8 members mentioned before shall not be allowed to vote...With this, we close the door to a possible influence taking (indirect bribe) by the Dominican Boxing Federation.”
- 8 July 2020 Letter from AIBA Interim President (Moustahsane) to AIBA Members outlining their review and amendment of AIBA Bylaws “to simplify the regulations and to ensure consistency between the Bylaws and the Statutes.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 October 2020</td>
<td>Email from AIBA to AIBA Election Committee with accompanying letter from Cayman Islands Boxing Assoc. asking them to urgently resolve eligibility of countries which paid their membership fee to AIBA via DR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 2020</td>
<td>Email from AIBA Congress to Leyla Jackson (Cayman Islands Boxing Assn.) about opinion by AIBA Election Committee that the 8 members mentioned before shall not be allowed to vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/7/9/10 November</td>
<td>Multiple emails from the 8 affected Associations to President to AIBA and IOC lodging a formal complaint/protest about being excluded from AIBA Congress by AIBA Election Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 November</td>
<td>Letter to Welten Bernhard, Chairman of AIBA Ethics Committee from AMBC President asking about previous 13 October Report as no reply was received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November</td>
<td>The AIBA Disciplinary Commission received the complaint of the AMBC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>Provision suspension of 9 Federations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December 2020</td>
<td>Decision. AIBA vs Caribbean National Federations. All 9 Federations found NOT GUILTY on all the charges and discharged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER:**

- 2 May 2019 Brief to the AIBA Disciplinary Commission.
- No other documents in folder.
- Konakbayev ASBC President.
- Issue: failure to turn over records, violation of Code of Ethics (Transparency, Accountability), including Article 3 Principles of Conduct, Article 4 Principles of Responsibility, Article 6.4.1 Disparagement of AIBA’s Reputation and Interests.

- Noted as “Serik not sent” in folder. Not clear as to if this proceeded; and, if not, why.
- Not clear as to if this proceeded; and, if not, why.
| OTHER: Bekzhan Bektenov, Kazakhstan Boxing Federation | - 24 May 2019 Brief to the AIBA Disciplinary Commission.  
- No other documents in folder.  
- Bekzhan Executive Director of KBF.  
- Issue: failure to turn over records, violation of Code of Ethics (Transparency, Accountability), including Article 3 Principles of Conduct, Article 4 Principles of Responsibility, Article 6.4.1 Disparagement of AIBA’s Reputation and Interests. | ✗ Brief in file is incomplete. Not clear as to if this proceeded; and, if not, why. |

Other Documents Located in Disciplinary Archive Files

- June 2015 employee group letter to CK Wu noting issues with Ho Kim.
- 8 June 2015 Notice of Dismissal to Ho Kim from CK Wu.
- 23 June 2015 Letter of Resignation from Ho Kim to AIBA Executive Committee members.
- Various media articles:
  “AIBA President rejects threat by Azerbaijani company demanding full repayment of $10 million loan.” Inside the Games, 15 August 2017.
  “AIBA staff locked out of Lausanne headquarters as police called to intervene in dispute.” Inside the Games, 26 July 2017.
  “Swiss Court rejects requests for urgent provisional measures in AIBA management.” Inside the Games, 25 September 2017.
  “AIBA crisis deepens as members call for impeachment of president Wu.” The Guardian, 1 August 2017.


AIBA Website Link: AIBA-Constitution_final.docx-3-2.pdf
- On 13 December 2020, AIBA adopted a new AIBA Constitution, replacing the AIBA statutes.
- References to AIBA Bylaws now “AIBA Regulations”.
- References to AIBA Statutes now “AIBA Constitution”.
- References to Disciplinary Commission now “Disciplinary Committee”.
- Article 46.3 of AIBA Constitution is a significant part of the AIBA reforms: “46.3 No Director may be a Competition Official” (introduced by AIBA Reform Commission to eliminate IOC concern re. the influence of AIBA management over the refereeing and judging).

3.0 **AIBA Procedural Rules – 8 April 2021 – Key Provisions**

AIBA Website Link: [AIBA_Procedural-Rules_FV.pdf](AIBA_Procedural-Rules_FV.pdf)

- The Procedural Rules shall be duly incorporated within respective applicable regulations by the Confederations and National Federations – Article 1.2.
- The new Procedural Rules provide for a central role to be fulfilled by the AIBA Integrity Officer who has the power inter alia to investigate and prosecute any alleged violation of the Disciplinary Code before the **Disciplinary Committee** or the **Ethics Committee**.
- According to Article 9 of the AIBA Procedural Rules, disciplinary proceedings are opened by the competent Judicial Body based on written submissions of the Integrity Officer. Note: During its meeting of April 21, 2021, the AIBA Board resolved that, for as
long as a permanent “Integrity Officer” had not been appointed, the AIBA “legal team” shall be appointed as AIBA Integrity Officers.

- Any person or body may make a report: to the Integrity Officer or directly to the competent Judicial Body. Note: any report is subject to a limitation period established by the Code of Ethics or Disciplinary Code.

- Article 47.2 & 47.3 of Procedural Rules indicates that parties have ten (10) days from notification of the decision to request, in writing, the motivated reasons for the decision. Failure to do so makes the decision becoming final and binding.

- Article 50 of Procedural Rules: a party may seek a reconsideration of the decision within thirty (30) days of the discovery of new facts/evidence, unless they could have been brought forward during the proceedings leading to the decision.

- Article 52 of Procedural Rules, the DC decision may be appealed before CAS in accordance of Article 48 of the AIBA Constitution within thirty (30) days following notification of the motivated decision.

- Appeals covered in Chapter 3.

- **Article 5.2 Confidentiality**: After pronouncing the decision, the Judicial Body may disclose the main points of the decision or proceed to publishing the full decision. If appropriate, the Judicial Body shall take steps to conceal the identity of the Parties and of any other participant in the proceedings. Article 47.6: AIBA Head Office publishes decisions on AIBA official website (Note: AIBA may decide to publish anonymized or a redacted version).

- Provisional measures can be imposed in urgent cases and during AIBA competitions where immediate action may be required.

- Parties can provide their own counsel, or can request AIBA provide pro bono counsel. (Note: a list of pro bono counsels is to be established by the Board and at least two appointed for each continent.)

- Time limits set by Judicial Bodies shall run for no less than five (5) days and no more than twenty (20) days (subject to reduction or extension based on circumstances).
4.0 Disciplinary Committee

AIBA Website Link: [Disciplinary Committee - AIBA](#)

- The DC is defined as one of two judicial bodies. The other is the Ethics Committee.
- Note: only the three most recent decisions are published at this link:
  - Case 2020/1: Matter concerning Caribbean national federations: [Decision of December 10th, 2020](#)

- Case 2021/01: AIBA vs Mustonen decision
- Case 2021/02: AIBA vs Alex Arturo Gonzalez Gutierrez


AIBA Website Link: [Microsoft Word - AIBA Disciplinary Code - Adopted July 18, 2013](#)

- The AIBA Disciplinary Code was approved on July 18, 2013.
- Article 2.1(d), the Code applies to “all persons subject to the statutes, bylaws, articles, constitutions of AIBA Confederations and AIBA National Federations.” (note references to “statutes” and “bylaws” shall mean “AIBA Constitution” and “AIBA Regulations” according to the new AIBA Constitution adopted on Dec. 13 2020).
- Under Article 12.3.1 of the Code, “The Disciplinary Commission [Disciplinary Committee] is authorized to sanction any violation which does not fall under the jurisdiction of another body or arises from a matter or a case which has been transferred, delegated, referred, or assigned by another body to the Disciplinary Commission.”
- Scope 2.6: The Judicial Bodies reserve the right to sanction serious infringements if Federations, Confederations, Franchisees and other sports organizations fail to prosecute serious infringements or fail to prosecute in compliance with the fundamental principles of law.
- Regulatory Offences include: (5.1) Violation of Statutes and Rules; (5.2) Failure to respect decisions.
Behavioral Offences include: (6.1) Conduct towards a Competition Official; (6.2) Inciting Hatred or Violence; (6.3) Attempt to undermine Honor; (6.4) Disparagement of AIBA’s Reputation and Interests; (6.5) Discrimination and Racism; (6.6) Liability for Spectator Conduct; (6.7) Provoking the General Public; (6.8) Threats and Coercion; (6.9) Relationship with a Suspended or Excluded National Federation; (6.10) Inciting a Boycott of an AIBA Competition; and, (6.11) Violation of the Principles of Conduct.

- (Note: 6.8 Threats and Coercion could include making threats to influence decision making, i.e. attempts at match-fixing, although this is largely covered under 8.3.1 Betting, Manipulation of Results, Corruption and Misuse of Inside Information. It appears that 6.8 and 8.3.1 are not mutually exclusive.)

The Code also includes Administrative Offenses and “Other Offences” including (8.1) Forgery and Falsification; (8.2) Doping; (8.3.1 Betting, Manipulation of Results, Corruption and Misuse of Inside Information).

There is a limitation period for imposition of sanctions. Subject to Art. 11.2 (which is in respect to anti-doping offences), no sanction may be imposed for an offence which occurred more than 3 years prior to the commencement of proceedings in relation to that offence.


AIBA Website Link: Microsoft Word - AIBA_Code_of_Ethics_final.docx

- (35.2) This Code applies to any ethics proceedings which have been formally opened after the date when this Code came into force.
(35.2) Ethics proceedings which have been formally opened before the date when this Code came into force shall be concluded according to the previous edition of the Code.

Article 2.1: The Ethics Committee is entitled to investigate and judge the conduct of persons who were bound by this or previously applicable Code at the time the relevant conduct occurred, regardless of whether the person remains bound by the Code at the time proceedings commence or any time thereafter. Ethics Committee is “entitled to investigate” as is the Integrity Officer and Discipline Committee; Note; Article 12 of the Procedural Rules includes “Conflict of Jurisdiction”...In case of conflict of jurisdiction, a final decision shall be taken at a joint meeting of the Ethics Committee and the Disciplinary Committee...

Limitation Period. Offences under articles 21 (including Betting and Match Manipulation) may be sanctioned provided that the relevant offence occurred less than 10 years prior to the commencement of proceedings in relation to that offence.

(25) Bribery and Corruption.

(27) Duty of Cooperation.

(33) Manipulation of Boxing Matches or Competitions ...shall immediately report to the Ethics Committee any approach in connection with activities and/or information directly or indirectly related to the possible manipulation of boxing matches and/or competitions.


The purpose of this Policy is to establish harmonised regulations to protect all Competitions from the risk of manipulation.
- Policy developed in compliance with Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (in particular Article 7) and the IOC Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions.
- Prohibited Conduct listed: Betting and Similar Activity; Manipulation of Boxing Matches or Competitions; Corrupt conduct; Inside Information; Failure to Report; Failure to Cooperate.